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Introduction
In this thesis I report on the work done during my Ph.D. and supervised by Professor Joachim
Rosenthal at the University of Zurich.
At this time, most of the chapters are already published in technical journals or submitted.
The papers were written in collaboration with many different co-authors and we will indicate in
each chapter to which papers the results are related to. The dissertation consists of three parts
which reflect our main interests. The first part is devoted to the study of density questions in
the case of global fields. Chapter 1 computes the density of coprime m-tuples over the ring of
algebraic integers O of a number field K. This result consists of a generalization of a theorem
by Cesaro over the rational integers: the natural density of the set of coprime pairs is 1/ζ(2),
where ζ is the Riemann Zeta function. Our definition of density relies on a choice of a Z-basis
for the ring of algebraic integers. Nevertheless, the final result is independent of that choice and
we get that the density of coprime m-tuples is 1/ζK(m), where ζK is the Dedekind zeta function
of the number field.
Chapter 2 addresses the same problem for an integrally closed subring of a function field (of
any genus) over a finite field using a suitable definition of density, which generalizes the one we
have in the case of polynomials over finite fields. In this case we use a definition of density based
on Moore-Smith convergence [20, Chapter 2] on the set of effective divisors in the complement
of the holomorphy set defining the subring. This definition is very natural since it is based on
a covering of the integrally closed ring via Riemann-Roch spaces; in addition it reduces to the
natural “degree based” density in the case of polynomials over finite fields.
In Chapter 3 we show some applications of a local-to-global principle for densities. Chapter
4 addresses a different density question for the case of subfield preserving maps over finite fields.
In particular: given a prime degree extension Fqp of a finite field Fq, what is the probability
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that a polynomial f over the base field Fq preserves the extension? i.e. what is the probability
that f(Fqp \ Fq) ⊆ Fqp \ Fq? We answer this question by solving a more general problem, i.e.
giving the explicit monoid structure of subfield preserving maps for any base field Fq and any
extension Fqm . As a corollary we get an interesting answer to our first question, of which a nice
instance is when q = p: in this case the density of subfield preserving maps approaches 1/e as
q = p→∞.
The second part of the dissertation contains results about linear maps over finite fields.
Chapter 5 deals with a general question on matrices over any field and we specialize only later
to the case of finite fields. As an application of the results, we break a non-commutative
key exchange cipher based on matrix rings which has been proposed in several variants in the
literature. Later on in the same chapter we focus the attention on the subfield preserving
question in the case of linear maps, which we completely answer in Theorem 80. In Chapter 7
we use the previous results to describe the group structure of invertible q-linearized maps over
finite fields with coefficients in some intermediate field between the base field Fq and Fqm .
The third part of the dissertation is devoted to a general construction for multiplicative
knapsack schemes. In particular we show some applications of the construction, which consist
of function field variants of the Naccache Stern Knapsack Scheme [36]. In Chapter 9 we provide
an information rate improvement for this variant.
Throughout the dissertation we preferred to keep all the chapters as independent as possible:
in this way, the reader which is interested in a particular result will not be obliged to read the
whole thesis up to the point he is willing to understand.
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Densities over Global Fields
8
Chapter 1
Cesa`ro Theorem for Number
Fields
The results presented in this chapter come from a joint work with Andrea Ferraguti [13].
1.1 Introduction
In 1881 Ernesto Cesa`ro proved that the natural density of the set of coprime pairs of integers
is 1/ζ(2), where ζ is the Riemann zeta function. An analytic proof of this result is presented
in the book by Hardy and Wright [15] while a generalization to the case of m-tuples of integers
has been given in [37].
If one tries to extend the formulation of the theorem to the case of algebraic integers, one
encounters some obstructions from the very beginning. In the next paragraphs the reader can
find some of the motivations that led to our approach to the problem, especially concerning the
definition of the density for a subset of the ring of algebraic integers O of a number field K.
Indeed, for the case of Z, there exists a “canonical” way to compute the density of a set A ⊆ Z:
this can be in fact defined as the limit in B (if it exists) of the sequence |A∩ [−B,B[|/(2B). This
definition extends to the density of a set A ⊆ Zm by considering the limit of the sequence |A ∩
[−B,B[m|/(2B)m. This definition characterizes the probability that, given the m-dimensional
hypercube of large side B centred in the origin, a uniformly random selected integer point has
all relatively prime entries.
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What can actually be done in the setting of algebraic integers is to consider the analogous
problem for the set of m-tuples of ideals of O using a suitable definition of density involving
the norm function. Very interesting results in this direction can be found in [45]. On the other
hand, if we want a proper generalization of Cesa`ro Theorem to O (and not to the set of ideals of
O) the approach presented in [45] does not apply: indeed, given a large bound B, there might
be infinitely many elements of norm at most B (contrary to what happens in the case of Z).
Therefore, not only this definition of density for sets of ideals of O cannot extend to a definition
of density for O, but also the analogous probability interpretation that one has over Z is missing.
A non canonical definition for the density of a subset A ⊆ O is obtained by considering
a Z-isomorphism ψ : O → Zn (n being the degree of the extension K ⊇ Q) and then by
computing the density of ψ(A) ⊆ Zn as previously described. The resulting density is then
dependent on the choice of ψ (that is equivalent to a choice of a Z-basis for O), but extends
to A ⊆ Om componentwise, as one would expect by considering the limit of the sequence
|ψ(A) ∩ [−B,B[mn|/(2B)mn. Using this definition of density for the set E ⊆ Om of coprime
m-tuples and a similar strategy to the one presented in [27] for the case of unimodular matrices
over Z, something surprising turns out to be true:
• the density d of E can be computed
• d is independent on the choice of the embedding ψ (i.e. independent of the choice of the
Z-basis for O)
• d equals 1/ζK(m), where ζK(m) is the Dedekind zeta function of the number field K.
This completely generalizes Cesa`ro Theorem to the case of number fields. It is very interesting
to note that this result matches the one presented in [45, Theorem 4.1], that was obtained in
the context of ideals of O.
Outline of the proof
Let us now briefly describe the strategy we used to compute the above mentioned density in
the general case of a subset E ⊆ ZN . First, we find a family {Et}t∈N of subsets of ZN with the
following properties:
• we are able to compute the density of Et for every t
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• Et+1 ⊆ Et
• ⋂tEt = E.
Then we verify that the family of sets {Et}t approximates the set E in density in the sense that
the sequence of densities of Et \ E converges to zero as t runs to infinity. Finally we compute
the limit in t of the density of the Et, obtaining the density of E. The reason why this method
works will be clarified later on.
1.1.1 Notation
Let H,H ′ be subsets of a commutative ring R and I an ideal of R. We say that H is congruent
to H ′ modulo I if the projections of H and H ′ are equal modulo I. Moreover we will write
H ≡ H ′ mod I.
Let R be a commutative ring, we say that the ideals I1, . . . , Il are coprime if
∑
j Ij = R; we
extend this notion to elements of R by considering the ideal generated by them. Let K be a
number field of degree n and O its ring of algebraic integers. Let E = {ei}ni=1 be a Z-basis for
O. Define
O[B,E] =
{
n−1∑
i=0
aiei | ai ∈ [−B,B[∩Z
}
.
Later on in the chapter we will just write O[B] since the basis will be understood. For p a prime
number, we denote by Sp = {p(p)1 , . . . , p(p)λp } the set of prime ideals lying over p. Let d
(p)
j be the
inertia degree of p
(p)
j (i.e. dimFp(O/p(p)j )) and denote by Dp the integer
∑λp
j=1 d
(p)
j . Let d be a
positive integer, let us denote by GF(p, d) the finite field of order pd. Define
Rp :=
λp∏
j=1
O/p(p)j ∼=
λp∏
j=1
GF(p, d
(p)
j ).
For z = (z1, . . . , zm) an element of Om, we denote by Iz the ideal generated by the set
{z1, . . . , zm}. If F is a field we denote by F∗ its multiplicative group.
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1.2 A definition for the density of the set of coprime m-
tuples
Let E be a Z-basis for O. Our goal is to define a notion of density (which will in general depend
on the choice of E) for a subset T of Om. We define the upper density of T with respect to E to
be
DE(T ) = lim sup
B→∞
|O[B,E] ∩ T |
(2B)mn
and the lower density of T with respect to E as
DE(T ) = lim inf
B→∞
|O[B,E] ∩ T |
(2B)mn
.
We say that T has density d with respect to E if
DE(T ) = DE(T ) =: DE(T ) = d.
Whenever this density is independent of the chosen basis E, it is consistent to denote the density
of a set T by D(T ) without any subscript.
Remark 1. First observe that d ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R by construction. The main idea behind this
definition of density is the same that one has over Z: the only difference is that the way in
which we cover the entire set (in this case O) is not canonical but depends on the basis E.
Example 2. Let us show with an example that choosing different bases for O can yield different
densities for the same subset T ⊆ O. Let K = Q(i), so that O = Z[i]. Let T = {x + iy ∈
O : x, y > 0}. If E = {1, i}, clearly |O[B,E] ∩ T | = (B − 1)2, which gives DE(T ) = 1/4. On
the other hand, choosing as a basis E′ = {1,−1 + i} = {e1, e2} we have that T = {xe1 + ye2 ∈
O : x, y > 0, x > y}. Therefore |O[B,E′]∩T | = (B− 1)(B− 2)/2, which shows that DE′ = 1/8.
Let E ⊆ Om be the set of coprime m-tuples, i.e. the elements z ∈ Om for which Iz = O.
A corollary of our final result (Theorem 9) is that the density of E is actually independent of
the basis E: even if the choice of the covering of Om is not canonical (it depends in fact on the
chosen Z-basis for O) the density of E is.
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1.3 Proof of Cesa`ro Theorem
Let S be a finite set of prime numbers. Let ES be the set of m-tuples z = (z1, . . . , zm) in Om
such that the ideal Iz is coprime with every p ∈ S.
Remark 3. Equivalently, one checks that
ES = {z ∈ Om | Iz + p(p)j = O ∀p ∈ S and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , λp}}
by observing that (p) ⊆∏j p(p)j and the p(p)j are maximal.
Let ψp : (O/(p))m → Rmp = (
∏λp
j=1O/p(p)j )m be the morphism induced by the projection
O/(p)∏λpj=1O/p(p)j . Recall that Dp = ∑λpj=1 d(p)j . In the following lemma and in Proposition
5 we will consider the surjection
pi : Om −→
∏
p∈S
Rp
m =: T
induced by the quotient maps O → O/p(p)j .
Lemma 4.
ES = pi
−1
∏
p∈S
λp∏
j=1
((
O/p(p)j
)m
\ {0}
)
Proof. Let z ∈ ES then Iz + p(p)j = O for all j, p, hence
O ≡ Iz mod p(p)j
then it follows that for each pair (j, p) there is at least one component of z that is different from
zero in O/p(p)j , thus z ∈
(
O/p(p)j
)m
\ {0} for each reduction. Vice versa, if
z ∈ pi−1
∏
p∈S
λp∏
j=1
((
O/p(p)j
)m
\ {0}
)
it follows that Iz is always congruent to O modulo p(p)i .
Proposition 5. Let q be a positive integer, E a Z-basis for O, S a finite set of prime numbers
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and N =
∏
p∈S p. Then
|ES ∩ O[qN ]m| = (2q)mn
∏
p∈S
pnm−mDp λp∏
j=1
(pd
(p)
j m − 1)

where O[qN ]m is the set of m-tuples of elements of O[qN ].
Proof. The key point is to decompose the map pi. For the rest of the proof, the reader may refer
to the following diagram:
Om piN−−−−→ (O/(N))m ψ−−−−→ T∥∥∥ ∥∥∥
(
∏
p∈SO/(p))m
ψ−−−−→ (∏p∈SRp)m
where piN is the quotient map, ψ = (. . . , ψp, . . . ) and ψ is its obvious extension to (O/(N))m
obtained by applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to primes in S. Notice then that pi =
ψ ◦piN . Our strategy to prove the result is to compute the cardinality of the fibers of ψ and the
intersection of the fibers of piN with O[qN ]:
• Observe that ψp : (O/(p))m → Rmp is a surjective morphism of Fp-vector spaces, there-
fore |ψ−1p (yp)| = | ker(ψp)| = pnm−mDp for all yp ∈ Rmp . It follows that |ψ
−1
(y)| =∏
p∈S |ψ−1p (yp)| =
∏
p∈S p
nm−mDp for all y ∈ (O/(N))m.
• Let z = (zj)j ∈ (O/(N))m and v = (vj)j ∈ Om. Write
zj =
(
n∑
t=0
rjtpi(et)
)
for some unique 0 ≤ rjt < N in Z. Observe that existence and uniqueness of the rjt follow
from the fact that O/(N) is a free Z/NZ-module of rank n with basis {pi(et)}. It follows
that piN (v) = z if and only if
vj =
n∑
t=0
(rjt + l
j
tN)et
for some ljt ∈ Z. We conclude then that |O[qN ]m ∩ pi−1N (z)| = (2q)mn: the rjt are fixed by
the condition piN (v) = z and l
j
t ∈ [−q, q[∩Z for each index j, t.
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Let us now complete the proof. By Lemma 4 we have that
ES ∩ O[qN ]m = pi−1
∏
p∈S
λp∏
j=1
((
O/p(p)j
)m
\ {0}
) ∩ O[qN ]m (1.1)
In order to simplify the notation, define
H := ψ−1
∏
p∈S
λp∏
j=1
((
O/p(p)j
)m
\ {0}
)
Since pi = ψ ◦ piN , Equation 1.1 reads
ES ∩ O[qN ]m = pi−1N (H) ∩ O[qN ]m.
Therefore
|pi−1N (H) ∩ O[qN ]m| = (2q)mn|H|
and
|H| =
∏
p∈S
pnm−Dpm λp∏
j=1
∣∣∣(O/p(p)j )m \ {0}∣∣∣
 .
Thus,
|ES ∩ O[B]| = (2q)mn
∏
p∈S
pnm−mDp λp∏
j=1
(pd
(p)
j m − 1)

Before we proceed, let us recall the following elementary calculus fact
Lemma 6. Let {aB}B∈N be a sequence of real numbers and N a positive integer. Then
lim
B→∞
aB = c ⇔ lim
q→∞ ar+qN = c ∀r ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}
Lemma 7.
D(ES) = DE(ES) =
∏
p∈S
λp∏
j=1
(
1− 1
pd
(p)
j m
)
=: D
Proof. Let
aB :=
|O[B]m ∩ ES|
(2B)mn
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Recall that N =
∏
p∈S p. Let us first show that aqN = D.
aqN =
|O[qN ]m ∩ ES|
(2qN)mn
=
=
(2q)mn
∏
p∈S p
nm−mDp∏λp
j=1(p
d
(p)
j m − 1)
(2qN)mn
.
By cancelling common factors in numerator and denominator and writing Dp according to its
definition we get
aqN =
∏
p∈S
p−m
∑λp
j=1 d
(p)
j
λp∏
j=1
(pd
(p)
j m − 1)
and bringing p−m
∑λp
j=1 d
(p)
j inside the products it follows that
aqN =
∏
p∈S
λp∏
j=1
(1− p−d(p)j m).
We are now ready to prove that
lim
B→∞
aB = D.
Thanks to lemma 6 it will be enough to show
lim
q→∞ ar+qN = D.
for all r ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. Indeed
aqN ·
(
(2qN)
2r + 2qN
)mn
< ar+qN < a(q+1)N ·
(
(2(q + 1)N)
2r + 2qN
)mn
By passing to the limit in q the claim follows.
Remark 8. It is immediate to observe that the density of ES is independent of the chosen basis
E.
We are now in a position to formulate and prove Cesa`ro Theorem for number fields.
Theorem 9. Let m be a positive integer and K be a number field. Let O be the ring of integers
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of K. The density of the set E of coprime m-tuples of O is
D(E) =
1
ζK(m)
where ζK is the Dedekind zeta function of the number field K.
Remark 10. Let St = {p1, . . . , pt}. The reader should observe that one has the inclusion
E ⊆ ESt and therefore
0 ≤ DE(E) ≤ DE(E) ≤ D(ESt).
As a consequence one has that in the case m = 1 Theorem 9 follows by passing to the limit
t→∞ in the above inequality and recalling that the Dedekind zeta function of K has a pole at
1. As expected in fact, the group of units of the ring of integers has density zero in any basis.
Observe that this is the special case k = 1 of [5, Corollary 4.2]. A more extensive description of
additive representations of elements in the unit group can be found in [2].
Remark 11. Notice that the argument of 10 does not lead to the conclusion in the case m > 1,
since it provides just an upper bound (uniform in E) for DE(E).
Before starting the proof let us recall the following theorem, which we will use as a funda-
mental tool. We are deeply grateful to Fabrizio Barroero for his suggestion of using it.
Theorem 12. Let S ⊆ RM be a bounded set whose boundary ∂S can be covered by the images
of at most W maps φ : [0, 1]M−1 → RM satisfying Lipschitz conditions
|φ(x)− φ(y)| ≤ L|x− y|
for the Euclidean norm. Then S is measurable. Let V = vol(S).
Let Λ ⊆ RM be a full-rank lattice and
λ1 := inf{|v| : v ∈ Λ \ {0}}
be its first successive minimum. Then
∣∣∣∣|Λ ∩ S| − Vdet Λ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ cW ( Lλ1 + 1
)M−1
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for a constant c depending only on M .
Proof. See [25, Lemma 2].
Next we are going to deduce from Theorem 12 the particular case that we will use in the
proof of Theorem 9.
Proposition 13. Let K be a number field of degree n with ring of integers O. Let I be an ideal
of O. Then ∣∣∣∣|(I ∩ O[B])m| − (2B)nmN(I)m
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c( 2Bc1N(I)1/n + 1
)mn−1
for every B ∈ N, where N(I) denotes the norm of I and the constants c, c1 are independent of
B and of I.
Proof. Recall that there is a canonical embedding of O into Rn: if σ1, . . . , σr are the real embed-
dings K → R and σr+1, . . . , σr+2s = σn are the complex ones labeled such that σr+i = σr+s+i,
then the map τ : O → Rn defined by x 7→ (σ1(x), . . . , σr(x), σr+1(x), . . . , σr+s(x)) embeds O as a
full-rank lattice in Rn, where each σr+i is thought as an embedding into R2. The map τ induces
an embedding τm : Om → Rmn. The image of O inside Rmn via τm is again a full-rank lattice.
Let αE : O −→ Zn be the isomorphism of Z-modules given by αE (
∑n
i=1 xiei) = (x1, . . . , xn).
Let αmE : Om → Zmn be the isomorphism induced by αE. Consider the following commutative
diagram
Om τ
m
−−−−→ RmnyαmE x A
Zmn ι−−−−→ Rmn
where ι is the inclusion map and A is the unique R-linear map which makes the diagram
commute. The idea now is to apply Theorem 12 with Λ = (ι ◦ αmE )(Im) ⊆ Rmn and S the cube
of side 2B centered in the origin, so that W = 2mn and L = 2B in the notation of the theorem.
Here by Im we mean the cartesian product of m copies of I inside Om.
We first need a lower bound for the first successive minimum of (ι ◦ αmE )(Im). To do this we
can clearly assume m = 1 since the first successive minimum of a lattice Λ ⊆ Rn coincides with
that of Λm ⊆ Rmn. Let v be a vector realizing the first successive minimum of (ι ◦ αE)(I) with
respect to the euclidean norm | · |. By Lemma 5 of [25], the first successive minimum of τ(I) is
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greater or equal than N(I)1/n. Since A(v) ∈ τ(I) we have that
N(I)1/n ≤ ‖A(v)‖ ≤ ‖A‖|v|
where ‖A‖ is defined by sup|w|=1 ‖A(w)‖. This shows that the first successive minimum of
(ι ◦ αE)(I) is greater or equal than c1N(I)1/n, where c1 := 1/‖A‖ is independent of B and of I.
Now the claim follows by applying Theorem 12 together with the fact that
det(αmE (I
m)) = det(αE(I))
m = [Zn : αE(I)]m = [O : I]m = N(I)m
and observing that |(ι ◦ αmE )(Im) ∩ [−B,B[mn| = |Im ∩ O[B]m| = |(I ∩ O[B])m|.
Proof of Theorem 9. We already proved the Theorem in the case m = 1 in remark 10, therefore
let us suppose m > 1. Let t be a positive integer, St the set consisting of the first t prime
numbers and define Et = ESt . Observe that, since Et ⊇ E we have
DE(E) ≤ D(Et) = D(Et).
By letting t run to infinity we get
DE(E) ≤ 1
ζK(m)
.
In order to show the opposite inequality observe that
D(Et)− DE(Et \ E) ≤ DE(E).
Therefore, it is enough to prove that lim
t→∞DE(Et \ E) = 0. For a prime ideal p ⊆ O, the t-th
prime number pt and M an integer, let us introduce the following notation
• p  N if and only if p lies over a prime greater than N (Notice that, with this notation,
one has that p  pt implies p + (pi) = O for every i ≤ t).
• M  p if and only if the rational prime lying under p is less than M .
With this notation one has
Et \ E ⊆
⋃
p∈P: ppt
pm ⊆ Om
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where pm is the set m-tuples of elements of O having all entries in p. It follows that
(Et \ E) ∩ O[B]m ⊆
⋃
p∈P: CBnppt
(p ∩ O[B])m
for C a positive constant independent of B. The upper bound CBn  p comes from the following
observation: for a fixed basis, the norm function is a polynomial of degree n in the coefficients
(with respect to the basis E) of the elements of O. Therefore N(O[B]) ⊆ [−CBn, CBn] for a
constant C depending only on the chosen basis. On the other hand, if an element of O[B] is in
p then its norm is divisible by the rational prime p lying under p. This shows that there cannot
exist primes p  CBn containing a nonzero element of O[B]. We have then
DE(Et \ E) ≤ lim sup
B→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
p∈P: CBnppt
pm ∩ O[B]m
∣∣∣∣∣∣ · (2B)−nm ≤
≤ lim sup
B→∞
∑
p∈P: CBnppt
|p ∩ O[B]|m · (2B)−nm.
By Proposition 13, |p∩O[B]|m = |(p∩O[B])m| ≤ (2B)
mn
N(p)m
+c
(
2B
c1N(p)1/n
+ 1
)mn−1
. Therefore
lim sup
B→∞
∑
p∈P: CBnppt
|p ∩ O[B]|m · (2B)−nm ≤
≤ lim sup
B→∞
∑
p∈P: CBnppt
1
N(p)m
+ c
(
2B
c1N(p)1/n
+ 1
)mn−1
· (2B)−nm ≤
≤ lim sup
B→∞
∑
p: CBn>p>pt
n
pm
+ cn
(
2B
c1p1/n
+ 1
)mn−1
· (2B)−nm =: Lt
where the last inequality holds because for every prime p of O one has that N(p) ≥ p for p the
rational prime lying under it and above a fixed rational prime lie at most n distinct primes of
O.
Choose now a constant c′1 ≤ c1 (independent of B) for which
1
C1/n
≥ c
′
1
2
. Notice that the sum
that appears in Lt is taken over primes p such that CB
n > p, which shows that
B >
1
C1/n
p1/n ≥ c
′
1
2
p1/n.
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It follows 2B
c′1p1/n
≥ 1 and then 2B
c′1p1/n
+ 1 ≤ 2 2B
c′1p1/n
. Therefore Lt is bounded by
lim sup
B→∞
∑
p: CBn>p>pt
n
pm
+ cn
(
4B
c′1p1/n
)mn−1
· (2B)−nm =
∑
p: CBn>p>pt
n
pm
+
c′
B · pm−1/n
for some other constant c′ independent of B and p. Now observe that
lim sup
B→∞
∑
p: CBn>p>pt
n
pm
≤
∑
p>pt
n
pm
tends to zero when t→∞ because the series
∑
p
1
pm
is convergent, while for the other term one
has that
lim sup
B→∞
∑
CBn>p>pt
c′
B · pm−1/n ≤ lim supB→∞
c′
B
∑
CBn>p>pt
1
p
= 0
since
∑
p<CBn
1
p is asymptotic to log log(CB
n).
The following corollary produces the classical generalization of Cesa`ro Theorem to the case
of m-tuples of integers (presented in [37]).
Corollary 14 (Extended Cesa`ro Theorem). The density of coprime m-tuples of integers is
1
ζ(m) , where ζ is the Riemann zeta function.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 9 by setting K = Q.
Remark 15. Observe that the results of Theorem 9 are coherent with the expectations. The
obtained density is in fact independent of the basis: by symmetry, indeed, all proofs can be done
by using another basis B, obtaining the same result. In addition, Theorem 9 extends Cesa`ro
Theorem for algebraic integers in the following sense: over Z one can equivalently consider the
density of the set of coprime m-tuples of integers or coprime m-tuples of ideals of Z without
any relevant distinction. If one is willing to do the same in the case of algebraic integers, one
has to choose in which context one wants to consider the problem: in the context of m-tuples
of ideals, the results in [45] are satisfying while in the setting of m-tuples of algebraic integers,
Theorem 9 answers the question. Curiously, even if the set up of the problem is very different,
the resulting densities match.
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Chapter 2
Cesa`ro Theorem for Function
Fields
In this chapter we provide the function field analogue of the result presented in the previous
one. This is a joint work with Reto Schnyder [33].
2.1 Introduction
Let Fq be a finite field with q elements and let F be an algebraic function field1 having full
constant field Fq. Let C be the set of places of F and S ( C be a non-empty proper subset. The
holomorphy ring of S is H = ⋂P∈S OP , where OP is the valuation ring of the place P .
In what follows we will say that an m-tuple of elements of H is coprime if its components
generate the unit ideal in H (in analogy to the case of the ring of integers in [13]). In this
chapter we define a notion of density for subsets of Hm, using Moore-Smith convergence for
nets [20, Chapter 2]. We then wish to study the density of the set of coprime m-tuples in H,
considered as a subset of Hm.
The special case F = Fq(x) and H =
⋂
P 6=P∞ OP = Fq[x] has been studied for m = 2 in [50]
and more generally in [14]. We will explain how to interpret the densities presented in these
papers as particular cases of our general framework. In fact, using the Riemann-Roch Theorem
and the absolute convergence of the zeta function of F , we are able to show that the density of
1In this chapter we will mostly use the language and notation of [49].
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coprime m-tuples of elements of a holomorphy ring exists and is equal to 1ζH(q−m) , where ζH is
the zeta function of the holomorphy ring.
Finally, we provide an example in the case of the affine ring of coordinates of an elliptic
curve to show a concrete application of the main result.
2.1.1 Notation
Let F/Fq be an algebraic function field with full constant field Fq, let g be the genus of F , and
let C be the set of its places. Let H be the holomorphy ring of a nonempty set of places S ( C.
For a fixed positive integer m, we wish to study the set of coprime m-tuples of elements of the
ring H. Let us denote this set by U :
U := {f = (f1, . . . , fm) ∈ Hm | If = H},
where If denotes the ideal of H generated by the set {f1, . . . fm}.
Define furthermore D := {D ∈ Div(F ) | D ≥ 0 ∧ supp(D) ⊆ C \ S}, the set of positive
divisors supported away from S. It follows that
H =
⋃
D∈D
L(D),
where L(D) denotes the Riemann-Roch space associated to a divisor D. Recall that we have a
bijection between the set of places S and the maximal ideals of H given by P 7→ P ∩H =: PH
(see for example [49, Proposition 3.2.9]). In analogy to the natural density of integers, we define
the superior density of a subset L ⊆ Hm as
D(L) := lim sup
D∈D
|L ∩ L(D)m|
|L(D)m| . (2.1)
This limit can be defined via Moore-Smith convergence [20, Chapter 2]. To be precise, the set of
divisors D with the usual partial order ≤ is a directed set, so the map from D to the topological
space R defined as
D 7→ |L ∩ L(D)
m|
|L(D)m|
is a net. Now, since R is Hausdorff, the definition in (2.1) is well posed. Analogously one can
23
define the inferior density as
D(L) := lim inf
D∈D
|L ∩ L(D)m|
|L(D)m| .
Moreover, whenever D(L) = D(L), we call this value the density of L and denote it by D(L).
2.2 The density of U
Recall that the zeta function of the function field F is given by
ζF (T ) :=
∏
P∈C
(
1− T deg(P )
)−1
for 0 < T < q−1. Analogously, we define the zeta function of the holomorphy ring H corre-
sponding to the set of places S as
ζH(T ) :=
∏
P∈S
(
1− T deg(P )
)−1
.
We will now state our main result.
Theorem 16. The density of the set of coprime tuples of length m ≥ 2 of the holomorphy ring
H is 1ζH(q−m) .
Proof. We first enumerate the set of places of S = {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qt, . . . }. Let us define
Ut := {f = (f1, . . . fm) ∈ Hm | If * (Qi)H ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , t}}
and notice that Ut ⊇ U . Observe that the condition If * (Qi)H is equivalent to the fact that
for each i there exists at least one fj that does not belong to Qi. Consider now the projection
pi : H → H/((Q1)H · · · (Qt)H) and observe that
H/((Q1)H · · · (Qt)H) ∼=
t∏
i=1
H/(Qi)H ∼=
t∏
i=1
FqdegQi ,
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by the Chinese remainder theorem over the ideals (Qi)H . This gives us a homomorphism
φ : H −→
t∏
i=1
FqdegQi ,
which we can extend to m-tuples by
φ̂ : Hm −→
t∏
i=1
FmqdegQi .
By construction, this homomorphism satisfies
Ut = φ̂
−1
(
t∏
i=1
(FmqdegQi \ {0})
)
. (2.2)
Consider now a divisor D ∈ D. We wish to count the number of elements in Ut ∩ L(D)m.
First, we will show that φ maps L(D) surjectively onto ∏ti=1 FqdegQi if degD is large enough.
For this, note that the image of L(D) under pi is L(D)/(L(D) ∩ ((Q1)H · · · (Qt)H)). The
space
L(D) ∩ ((Q1)H · · · (Qt)H) = L(D) ∩Q1 ∩ · · · ∩Qt
consists of all elements in L(D) with at least a root at each Qi, so it is equal to L(D−
∑t
i=1Qi).
(Note that the Qi cannot be in the support of D.) Hence, its dimension as an Fq-vector space
is `(D −∑ti=1Qi), which is equal to degD −∑ti=1 degQi + 1 − g if degD is large enough by
Riemann-Roch Theorem. On the other hand, the dimension of L(D) is then `(D) = degD+1−g,
and so the image has dimension
∑t
i=1 degQi, the same as
∏t
i=1 FqdegQi .
We can now count the elements of Ut∩L(D)m using (2.2). As we have just seen, the dimension
of the kernel of φ restricted to L(D) is `(D−∑ti=1Qi), so each element of ∏ti=1(FmqdegQi \ {0})
is the image under φ̂ of exactly qm`(D−
∑t
i=1Qi) elements of Ut ∩ L(D)m. Hence we get
|Ut ∩ L(D)m|
|L(D)m| = q
m(`(D−∑ti=1Qi)−`(D)) · t∏
i=1
(qm degQi − 1) =
t∏
i=1
(1− q−m degQi)
if degD is large enough. It follows that the density of Ut is well-defined and equals
D(Ut) = lim
D∈D
|Ut ∩ L(D)m|
|L(D)m| =
t∏
i=1
(1− q−m degQi).
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Since U ⊆ Ut, it follows that D(U) ≤ D(Ut).
To get an estimate in the other direction, let us write (L(D) ∩ U) ∪ (L(D) ∩ (Ut \ U)) =
L(D) ∩ Ut. We have
D(U) = lim inf
D∈D
|U ∩ L(D)m|
qm`(D)
≥ lim
D∈D
|Ut ∩ L(D)m|
qm`(D)
− lim sup
D∈D
|(Ut \ U) ∩ L(D)m|
qm`(D)
,
hence we have the inequalities
D(Ut) ≥ D(U) ≥ D(U) ≥ D(Ut)− lim sup
D∈D
|(Ut \ U) ∩ L(D)m|
qm`(D)
. (2.3)
Now, passing to the limit in t we get that lim
t→∞D(Ut) = 1/ζH(q
−m). Therefore it remains to
prove that
lim
t→∞ lim supD∈D
|(Ut \ U) ∩ L(D)m|
qm`(D)
= 0.
In order to prove the last claim, let us denote by Qt the set {Q1, . . . , Qt}, and notice
Ut \ U ⊆
⋃
P∈S\Qt
{A ∈ Hm | IA ⊆ PH} =
⋃
P∈S\Qt
PmH ,
where by PmH we mean the Cartesian product of m copies of the ideal PH . Fix now a divisor
D ∈ D. It follows that
(Ut \ U) ∩ L(D)m ⊆
⋃
P∈S\Qt
(PH ∩ L(D))m =
⋃
P∈S\Qt
L(D − P )m =
⋃
P∈S\Qt
degP≤degD
L(D − P )m.
The last equality holds because L(D−P ) = 0 if degD− degP < 0. With this containment, we
can now estimate the last term of (2.3):
lim sup
D∈D
|L(D) ∩ (Ut \ U)|
qm`(D)
≤ lim sup
D∈D
∣∣∣⋃
P∈S\Qt
degP≤degD
L(D − P )m
∣∣∣ · q−m`(D)
≤ lim sup
D∈D
∑
P∈S\Qt
degP≤degD
∣∣∣L(D − P )m∣∣∣ · q−m`(D)
= lim sup
D∈D
∑
P∈S\Qt
degP≤degD
qm(`(D−P )−`(D))
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Now observe that we have `(D) ≥ deg(D) + 1 − g and `(D − P ) ≤ deg(D − P ) + 1, since
deg(D − P ) ≥ 0 [49, Eq. 1.21 and Theorem 1.4.17]. It follows that the above is less or equal to
lim sup
D∈D
∑
P∈S\Qt
degP≤degD
qm(g−degP ) = lim sup
d→∞
qgm
∑
P∈S\Qt
degP≤d
(q−m)degP = qgm
∑
P∈S\Qt
(q−m)degP .
Observe that
∑
P∈S\Qt q
−m degP is the tail of a subseries of the zeta function of F evaluated
at q−m < q−1, which is absolutely convergent (see for example [35, Chapter 3]). As t goes to
infinity, it converges to 0, from which our claim follows.
2.3 Consequences
The reader should observe that in Theorem 16 both S and C\S could possibly be infinite and the
result will still hold. Nevertheless, the density depends on the zeta function of the holomorphy
ring, which may be hard to compute. First of all notice that this is not the case when S is finite
since under this condition ζH is a finite product. The following immediate corollary covers the
case in which C \ S is finite.
Corollary 17. Let F be a function field, S a set of places of F and H the holomorphy ring of
S. Let LF (T ) be the L-polynomial of F . Then
ζH(q
−m) =
LF (q
−m)
(1− q−m)(1− q−m+1)
∏
P∈C\S
(
1− 1
qdeg(P )m
)
.
Proof. The corollary follows from Theorem 16, the definition of ζH and the expression of the
zeta function of F in terms of the L-polynomial.
Remark 18. Observe now that in the case where C \S is finite, the density of coprime m-tuples
of H essentially only depends on the degrees of the places in C \ S and the L-polynomial of the
function field, which again only depends on the Fqi-rational points of the curve associated to
the function field for i ∈ {1, . . . , g} (see for example [49, Corollary 5.1.17]).
27
2.3.1 An example
Let char(Fq) 6= 2, 3 for simplicity. Let a, b ∈ Fq and p(x, y) = y2 − x3 − ax− b be a polynomial
defining an elliptic curve E over Fq. Let us define
A(E) := Fq[x, y]/(p(x, y)).
Let E(Fq) denote the set of (projective) Fq-rational points of E (i.e. the places of degree one of
the function field of E).
Corollary 19. The density of m-tuples of coprime elements of A(E) is
D(U) =
1− q−m+1
1 + aqq−m + q−2m+1
(2.4)
where aq = q + 1− |E(Fq)|.
Proof. Observe that the zeta function of an elliptic curve is
ζE(T ) =
1 + aqT + qT
(1− qT )(1− T ) .
The result follows from Theorem 16 applied to the holomorphy ring A(E) =
⋂
P 6=P∞ OP where
P∞ is the place at infinity of E with respect to p(x, y).
Remark 20. The reader should notice again that (2.4) depends only on the number of Fq-
rational points of E, since the genus of E equals one. The probabilistic interpretation of Corol-
lary 19 is the following: select uniformly at random m elements of A(E) of degree at most N ,
then the probability that they generate the unit ideal in A(E) approaches
1− q−m+1
1 + aqq−m + q−2m+1
as N →∞.
2.3.2 The case F = Fq(x)
In the remaining part of this section we show how the result of [14] about Fq[x] fits in our
framework. We denote by P∞ the place at infinity of the function field Fq(x).
The reader should observe that the definition of density for Fq[x] given in [14, 50] agrees
with ours for H = Fq[x] =
⋂
P 6=P∞ OP , so we have [50, Theorem 1] as a corollary with m = 2.
More generally, we obtain the result in [14] for unimodular rows over Fq[x]:
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Corollary 21. Let m > 1 be an integer. The density of unimodular rows of length m over Fq[x]
is
D(U) = 1− 1
qm−1
Proof. It is enough to notice that the zeta function of the function field Fq(x) (i.e. the zeta
function of the projective line) is
ζFq(x)(T ) =
1
(1− T )(1− qT )
and then the zeta function of the holomorphy ring Fq[x] =
⋂
P 6=P∞ OP is
ζFq [x](T ) =
1
1− qT .
The claim follows by inverting the expression above and evaluating at q−m.
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Chapter 3
Density of Eisenstein Polynomials
from a local to global principle
In this short chapter we prove some of the results of [17] using a powerful lemma in [42]. Let
A ⊆ Zd, we define the natural density of A
ρ(A) := lim
B→∞
|A ∩ [−B,B[d|
(2B)d
.
Let µp be the p-adic measure on Zdp and µ∞ the Lebesgue measure on Rd.
Lemma 22. Suppose U∞ ⊆ Rd is such that R+ · U∞ = U∞, µ∞(∂U∞) = 0. Let U1∞ = U∞ ∩
[−1, 1]d and s∞ = µ∞(U1∞). Let Up ⊆ Zdp , µp(∂Up) = 0 and sp = µp(Up). Let MQ be the set of
places of Q. Moreover, suppose that
lim
M→∞
ρ({a ∈ Zd : a ∈ Up for some finite prime p greater than M}) = 0. (3.1)
Let P : Zd −→ 2MQ defined as P (a) = {v ∈MQ : a ∈ Uv}. Then we have
1.
∑
v sv converges
2. for T ⊆ 2MQ , ν(T ) := ρ(P−1(T )) exists and defines a measure on 2MQ , which is concen-
trated at the finite subsets of MQ.
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3. Let S be a finite subset of MQ, then
ν({S}) =
∏
v∈S
sv
∏
v/∈S
(1− sv).
Proof. For the proof, see [42, Lemma 20].
Let E be the set of monic Eisenstein polynomials of fixed degree d > 1 i.e.
E = {xd +
d−1∑
i=0
aix
i | ∃ p prime : p|ai ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} and p2 - a0}
Theorem 23. The set of monic Eisenstein polynomials of degree d has natural density
1−
∏
p:prime
(
1− p− 1
pd+1
)
.
Proof. With a small abuse of notation we regard at E as subset of Zd. Set U∞ = ∅ and
Up := (pZp \ p2Zp)× pZp × · · · × pZp ⊆ Zdp
Condition (2) of the lemma is easily verified by the convergence of
∑
p:prime
1
pd
for d > 1. In addition, the measure sp of Up is (p − 1)/pd+1. The key observation is that
P−1({∅}) equals the complement of E. It follows that
ρ(E) = 1− ρ(P−1({∅})) = 1−
∏
p:prime
(
1− p− 1
pd+1
)
.
Let
E = {
d∑
i=0
aix
i | ∃ p prime : p|ai ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, p2 - a0 and p - ad}
be the set of non-monic Eisenstein polynomials. We have
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Theorem 24. The set of non-monic Eisenstein polynomials of degree d has natural density
1−
∏
p:prime
(
1− (p− 1)
2
pd+2
)
.
Proof. Set again U∞ = ∅ and
Up = (pZp \ p2Zp)× pZp × · · · × pZp × Zp \ pZp ⊆ Zd+1p .
Again, condition (2) of the lemma is easily verified for d ≥ 2. Moreover,
µp(Up) =
(
1
p
− 1
p2
)
1
pd−1
(
1− 1
p
)
=
(p− 1)2
pd+2
=: sp.
Observing that P−1({∅}) equals the complement of E we get the claim:
ρ(E) = 1− ρ(P−1({∅})) = 1−
∏
p:prime
(
1− (p− 1)
2
pd+2
)
.
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Chapter 4
On q-canonical m-subfield
preserving polynomials
In this Chapter we study the monoid structure of subfield preserving maps together with den-
sities arising from this context. This is a joint work with Davide Schipani [32].
4.1 Introduction
Let q be a prime power and m a natural number. In [4] the structure of the group consisting of
permutation polynomials [24] of Fqm having coefficients in the base field Fq was made explicit.
We start observing that, if f is a permutation of Fqm with coefficients in Fq then
f(Fq) = Fq and ∀ d, s | m f(Fqd \ Fqs) = Fqd \ Fqs .
Indeed for any integer s ≥ 1, since f has coefficients in Fq and Fqs is a field, we have f(Fqs) ⊆ Fqs .
Being f also a bijection, this is also an equality. The property above follows then directly (see
also [4, Lemma 2]).
It is natural now to ask which are the polynomials f , having coefficients in Fq, such that
f(Fq) ⊆ Fq and ∀ d, s | m f(Fqd \ Fqs) ⊆ Fqd \ Fqs . (4.1)
Let us call Tmq the set of such polynomials. We remark that this is a monoid under compo-
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sition and its invertible elements (Tmq )
∗ consist of the group of permutation polynomials with
coefficients in Fq mentioned above. In this chapter we give the explicit semigroup structure of
Tmq , obtaining the main result of [4] (i.e. the group structure mentioned above) as a corollary.
The explicit semigroup structure will allow us to compute the probability that a polynomial
chosen uniformly at random having coefficients in Fq satisfies condition (4.1). This will imply
the following remarkable results:
• Given p prime, for q relatively large, the density of T pq is approximately zero.
• Given q, for p relatively large prime, the density of T pq is approximately one.
• For q = p large prime the density of T pp is approximately 1/e.
4.2 Preliminary definitions
Definition 25. We say f : Fqm → Fqm to be subfield preserving if
f(Fq) ⊆ Fq and ∀ d, s | m f(Fqd \ Fqs) ⊆ Fqd \ Fqs . (4.2)
Moreover, we will say f to be q-canonical if its polynomial representation has coefficients in Fq
(or simply canonical when q is understood).
Remark 26. One of the reason why we use the term canonical to address the property of
having coefficients in a subfield is that, under this property, the induced application f˜ of f(x)
is always well defined no matter what irreducible polynomial we choose for the representation
of the finite field extension Fqm .
Denote by LFqm the set of all subfield preserving polynomials.
Remark 27. If we drop the condition on the coefficients, the semigroup structure becomes
straightforward:
LFqm ∼=×
k|m
M[kpi(k)].
with pi(k) being the number of monic irreducible polynomials of degree k over Fq and M[n] being
the set of all maps from {1, . . . , n} to itself.
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Remark 28. Clearly not all subfield preserving polynomials are canonical, which can also be
checked by a cardinality count with the results later in this chapter.
In the rest of the chapter we will need the following lemma, whose proof can be easily adapted
from [4].
Lemma 29. Let f : Fqm → Fqm be a map. Then f ∈ Fq[x] if and only if f ◦ ϕq = ϕq ◦ f where
ϕq(x) = x
q.
Indeed the set of functions we are looking at consists of Tmq = LFqm ∩ Cϕq where Cϕq := {f :
Fqm → Fqm | f ◦ ϕq = ϕq ◦ f}.
4.3 Combinatorial underpinning
Let S be a finite set and ψ : S → S a bijection. For any T ⊆ S, let
Kψ(T ) := {f : T → T | ∀x ∈ T f ◦ ψ(x) = ψ ◦ f(x)}.
For any partition P of S into sets Pk, let
MS(P) := {f : S → S | ∀ k f(Pk) ⊆ Pk}.
When P = {S} is the trivial partition, we will denote MS({S}) = MS namely the monoid of
applications from S to itself.
For any bijection φ : S → S, define φk for any k as the composition of the cycles of φ of
length k, and set φk = (∅) if φ has no cycles of length k. Let W denote the set {1, . . . , |S|},
then φ =
∏
k∈W,φk 6=(∅)
φk. If supp(φk) denotes the set of elements moved by φk, then φ induces a
partition Pφ on S =
⋃
k∈W
Sk, with Sk = supp(φk), for k ≥ 2, and S1 being the set of fixed points
of φ.
Lemma 30.
MS(Pφ) ∩ Kφ(S) ∼= ×
k∈W,φk 6=(∅)
Kφk(Sk)
Proof. Clearly any f ∈ Kφk(Sk) can be extended to S as the identity and then the extension f¯
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belongs to Kφ(S) ∩MS(Pφ). Indeed we have a natural injection
×
k∈W,φk 6=(∅)
Kφk(Sk) ↪→MS(Pφ) ∩ Kφ(S).
This is also a surjection: in fact let f ∈MS(Pφ) ∩ Kφ(S) and define
fk(x) :=

f(x) if x ∈ Sk,
x otherwise.
Since MS(Pφ) ∩ Kφ(S) ⊆MS(Pφ), then fk(Sk) ⊆ Sk which implies
fk
∣∣
Sk
∈ Kφk(Sk).
As the Sk form a partition, the composition of all the fk coincides with f .
Now, for n, k ∈ N let Ukn be a set with kn elements and ψ a bijection of Ukn having n cycles
of length k. Let us put indices on the elements of the set in the following way: let aij be the
j-th element of the i-th cycle, with i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Let [h] denote {1, . . . , h} for a natural number h. We say λ : [h]→ [h] to be a cyclic shift of
[h] if λ(j + `) = λ(j) + ` modulo h for any j, ` ∈ [h].
Let γ1, . . . , γn be cyclic shifts of [k] and σ : [n]→ [n] a map. We construct then fγσ : Ukn → Ukn
as follows:
fγσ (aij) := aσ(i)γi(j).
Theorem 31. g ∈ Kψ(Ukn) ⇔ ∃ γ := (γ1, . . . , γn), γi cyclic shifts of [k], and ∃ σ : [n] → [n]
map such that g = fγσ .
Proof. Suppose first g ∈ Kψ(Ukn). Then
g(aij) = g(ψ
j−1(ai1)) = ψj−1(g(ai1)).
Define σ(i) := [g(ai1)]1 and γi(j) := [g(aij)]2, where the subscripts [x]1 and [x]2 refer to the two
indices of x ∈ Ukn in the representation aij above.
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Observe that for all i ∈ [n], γi is a cyclic shift, indeed it holds modulo k:
γi(j + `) = [g(ai j+`)]2 = [g(ψ
`(aij))]2 =
[ψ`(g(aij))]2 = [g(aij)]2 + ` = γi(j) + `.
Moreover remark that
g(aij) = g(ψ
j−1(ai1)) = ψj−1(g(ai1)) = ψj−1(aσ(i)γi(1)) =
aσ(i) γi(1)+j−1 = aσ(i)γi(j) = f
γ
σ (aij).
Let us prove now the other implication:
ψ(fγσ (aij)) = ψ(aσ(i)γi(j)) = aσ(i) γi(j)+1 =
aσ(i)γi(j+1) = f
γ
σ (ai j+1) = f
γ
σ (ψ(aij))
for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [k].
4.3.1 Semidirect product of monoids
We now recall the definition of semidirect product of monoids
Definition 32. Let M,N be monoids and let Γ : M → End(N) with m 7→ Γm be an antiho-
momorphism of monoids (i.e. Γm1m2 = Γm2 ◦ Γm1). We define M nΓ N as the monoid having
support M ×N and operation ∗ defined by the formula
(m1, n1) ∗ (m2, n2) = (m1m2,Γm2(n1)n2)
Remark 33. It is straightforward to verify that the associative property holds.
We will now prove an easy lemma that will be useful in Section 4.4. For any monoid H let
us denote by H∗ the group of invertible elements of H.
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Lemma 34. Let M nG be a semidirect product of monoids where G is a group. Then
(M nG)∗ = M∗ nG
Proof. The inclusion (M nG)∗ ⊆M∗nG is trivial, since if (m, g) ∈ (M nG)∗ then there exists
(m′, g′) such that
(m, g) ∗ (m′, g′) = (e1, e2)
so mm′ = e1 identity element of M . Let us now prove (MnG)∗ ⊇M∗nG. Let (m, g) ∈M∗nG,
then its inverse is (m−1,Γm−1(g−1)).
We are now ready to prove the main proposition of this section as a corollary of Theorem
31.
We first observe that the set of cyclic shifts of [k] is clearly isomorphic to Ck, the cyclic
group of order k, and each cyclic shift can be identified by its action on 1.
Corollary 35.
Kψ(Ukn) ∼= M[n] nΓ Cnk
where Γ is defined by
Γ(σ)(γ) := Γσ(γ) := γσ := (γσ(1), . . . , γσ(n))
for any γ ∈ Cnk .
Proof. The reader should first observe
Γµ(γσ(1), . . . , γσ(n)) = (γσ(µ(1)), . . . , γσ(µ(i)), . . . , γσ(µ(n)))
for any σ, µ ∈ M[n]. This can be easily seen by denoting γσ(i) =: gi. Therefore, Γ is an
antihomomorphism, as we wanted:
Γ(σµ)(γ) = γσµ = (γσ(µ(1)), . . . , γσ(µ(i)), . . . , γσ(µ(n))) =
Γµ(γσ(1), . . . , γσ(n)) = Γµ ◦ Γσ(γ).
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Let
∆ : M[n] n Cnk −→ Kψ(Ukn)
(σ, γ) 7→ fγσ .
∆ is clearly a bijection by Theorem 31. It is also an automorphism since
∆((σ, γ) ∗ (σ, γ))(ai,j) = ∆(σσ, γσγ)(ai,j) = fγσγσσ (ai,j) =
aσσ(i),γσ(i)γi(j) = f
γ
σ (aσ(i),γi(j)) = f
γ
σ ◦ fγσ (ai,j) =
(
∆(σ, γ) ◦∆(σ, γ))(ai,j)
for all i ∈ [n] and all j ∈ [k].
4.4 Semigroup structure of Tmq
Consider now Tmq and notice that, since MFqm (Pϕq ) = LFqm and Kϕq (Fqm) = Cϕq , then we have
Tmq = LFqm ∩ Cϕq = MFqm (Pϕq ) ∩ Kϕq (Fqm). (4.3)
Indeed the condition
f(Sk) ⊆ Sk
for each Sk in the partition induced by ϕq is equivalent to the subfield preserving requirement
(4.2), being
S1 = Fq and Sk =
⋂
a|k, a 6=k
(
Fqk \ Fqa
)
for k ≥ 2.
Any element α in a cycle of length d is associated to the irreducible polynomial
d−1∏
i=0
(x− αqi) ∈
Fq[x], so there is a bijection between the cycles of ϕq of length d and the monic irreducible
polynomials of degree d over Fq, whose cardinality is
pi(d) =
1
d
∑
j |d
µ(d/j)qj
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with µ being the Moebius function. Now, write
ϕq =
∏
k |m
φk
similarly as above with φ = ϕq and label the elements of the finite field as follow: a
(k)
i,j is the
j-th element living in the i-th k-cycle.
Example 36. Let F22 = F2[α]/(α2 + α+ 1) consisting of {0, 1, α, α+ 1}. Indeed
ϕq = φ1φ2 = (0)(1)(α, α+ 1)
and then a
(1)
1,1 = 0, a
(1)
2,1 = 1, a
(2)
1,1 = α and a
(2)
1,2 = α+ 1.
Theorem 37.
Tmq
∼=×
k|m
M[pi(k)] n C
pi(k)
k (4.4)
Proof. It follows from Lemma 30 and Corollary 35 using the partition induced by the Frobenius
morphism. Indeed, using equation 4.3 and Lemma 30 we get
Tmq
∼= ×
k∈W,φk 6=(∅)
Kφk(Sk).
Using now Corollary 35 we get
Tmq
∼=×
k|m
M[pi(k)] n C
pi(k)
k .
More explicitly, the action of t ∈×
k|m
M[pi(k)] n C
pi(k)
k on an element a
(k)
i,j ∈ Sk ⊆ Fqm is given by
t(a
(k)
i,j ) = (σ
(k), γ(k))(a
(k)
i,j ) = f
γ(k)
σ(k)
(a
(k)
i,j ) = a
(k)
σ(k)(i),γ
(k)
i (j)
where γ(k) and σ(k) are the components indexed by k.
Corollary 38.
(Tmq )
∗ ∼=×
k|m
Spi(k) n Cpi(k)k
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where Spi(k) is the permutation group of pi(k) elements.
Proof. Observe that
(Tmq )
∗ ∼=×
k|m
(M[pi(k)] n C
pi(k)
k )
∗
holds trivially. Applying now Lemma 34 yields
(Tmq )
∗ ∼=×
k|m
(M[pi(k)] n C
pi(k)
k )
∗ ∼=×
k|m
Spi(k) n Cpi(k)k .
Corollary 39.
|Tmq | =
∏
k |m
kpi(k)pi(k)pi(k)
|(Tmq )∗| =
∏
k |m
kpi(k)pi(k)!
Remark 40. Corollary 38 corresponds to [4, Theorem 2] and Corollary 39 generalizes the
corollary of [4, Theorem 2].
Remark 41. Let us observe that a simpler construction as a direct product for (Tmq )
∗ can also
be seen as follows:
• First notice that any permutation polynomial over Fq can be extended to a permutation
polynomial over Fqm with coefficients in Fq by simply defining it as the identity function
on Fqm \ Fq and Lagrange interpolating over the whole field. The produced permutation
polynomial over Fqm has coefficients in Fq, since it commutes with ϕq, which is easily
checked by looking at the base field and the rest separately.
• (Tmq )∗ has then a normal subgroup isomorphic to Sq consisting of
{s ∈ Tmq ∗ | s is the identity on Fqm \ Fq}.
• Let
Hmq := {h ∈ (Tmq )∗ |h is the identity on Fq}.
Hmq is also normal in (T
m
q )
∗.
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• Sq ×Hmq = (Tmq )∗. Indeed note first that Hmq ∩ Sq = 1. Now given f ∈ (Tmq )∗ we have to
prove that it can be written as a composition of an element of Hmq and an element of Sq.
Let s2 ∈ Sq such that s2 restricted to Fq is f . Let s1(x) ∈ Sq such that s1 restricted to Fq
is the inverse permutation of the restriction of f to Fq. In other words f(s1(x)) restricted
to Fq is the identity. Observe then that, since f(s1(x)) has also coefficients in Fq, it lives
in Hmq . Verify that s2(f(s1(x))) = f . And so we have written f as a composition of an
element of Sq and an element of Hmq .
4.5 Asymptotic density of Tmq
Let us first compute the asymptotic density of the group of permutation polynomials described in
[4] inside the whole group of permutation polynomials, and inside the monoid of the polynomial
functions having coefficients in the subfield Fq. We will restrict to the case Fqp , p prime.
Theorem 42. Consider an element of Fq[x]/(xq
p − x) chosen uniformly at random. The prob-
ability that this is a permutation polynomial tends to 0 as p and/or q tends to ∞.
Proof. Given Corollary 39, we need to consider
L := lim
p∨q→∞
q!(p)
qp−q
p ( q
p−q
p )!
qqp
.
By Stirling approximation this is
L = lim
p∨q→∞
q!(p)
qp−q
p ( q
p−q
pe )
qp−q
p
√
2pi q
p−q
p
qqp
.
Now notice that
lim
p∨q→∞
(
qp − q
qp
) qp−q
p
= lim
p∨q→∞
(
1− 1
qp−1
)qp−1· q−q2−pp
By the continuity of the exponential function, this can be written as
lim
p∨q→∞ e
q−q2−p
p ln
(
1− 1
qp−1
)qp−1
= e
− lim
p∨q→∞
q
p
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so that
L = lim
p∨q→∞
q!(qp)
qp−q
p e−
q
p
√
2pi q
p−q
p
qqpe
qp−q
p
.
= lim
p∨q→∞
q!e−
q
p
√
2pi q
p−q
p
qqe
qp−q
p
= 0,
as one can easily see by exploring the cases q →∞ with Stirling and q fixed.
By observing that qp! > qq
p
definitively for large p and/or q, we have also the following:
Corollary 43. Consider a permutation of the set Fqp chosen uniformly at random. The proba-
bility that its associated permutation polynomial has coefficients in the subfield Fq tends to 0 as
p and/or q tends to ∞.
We are now interested in an asymptotic estimate for the density of T pq in Fq[x]/(xq
p − x)
for p prime number. We will show in fact that the monoid of canonical subfield preserving
polynomials has nontrivial density inside the monoid of polynomial functions having coefficients
in the subfield Fq. Given Corollary 39, the probability that an element of Fq[x]/(xq
p−x) chosen
uniformly at random is subfield preserving is
|T pq |
qqp
=
qq(qp − q) q
p−q
p
qqp
.
Theorem 44. Consider an element of Fq[x]/(xq
p − x) chosen uniformly at random. The prob-
ability that this is subfield preserving tends to e
− lim
p∨q→∞
q
p as p and/or q tends to ∞.
Proof. We need to consider
` := lim
p∨q→∞
qq(qp − q) q
p−q
p
qqp
.
With similar arguments as in Theorem 42, this transforms to
` = lim
p∨q→∞
qq(qp)
qp−q
p
qqp
e−
q
p = e
− lim
p∨q→∞
q
p
Corollary 45.
• lim
p→∞
|Tpq |
qq
p = 1, if q is fixed.
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• lim
q→∞
|Tpq |
qq
p = 0, if p is fixed.
Corollary 46. Let q = p.
lim
p→∞
|T pp |
ppp
= 1/e
Remark 47. Clearly all the limits above are computed for p and q running over the natural
numbers, but they hold in particular for the subsequences of increasing primes p and possible
orders of finite fields q.
4.6 Example
Let us consider the structure of T 22 as an example. Let α be a root of x
2 + x + 1 = 0, so that
F22 = F2[α]/(α2 + α+ 1). It is easy to check that for each polynomial f ∈ L with
L := {0, 1, x2 + x, x2 + x+ 1, x3, x3 + 1, x3 + x2 + x, x3 + x2 + x+ 1}
we have f(α) ∈ F2. We know that T 22 contains 8 polynomials, so that
T 22 =
F2[x]
(x4 − x) \ L =
{x, x+ 1, x2, x2 + 1, x3 + x2 + 1, x3 + x, x3 + x2, x3 + x+ 1}.
The structure is C2×M2.
Indeed C21 oM2 = M2 and consists of
{x, x2 + 1, x3 + x2, x3 + x+ 1}
that is those functions which fix F4 \ F2 and act as M2 on F2.
Also C2 oM1 = C2 and consists of
{x, x2}
that is those functions which fix F2 and act as C2 on F4 \ F2. This is also H22 .
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Part II
Linear Maps over Finite Fields
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Chapter 5
Linear Spanning sets
The results presented in this chapter come from a joint work with Joachim Rosenthal and Paolo
Vettori [34].
5.1 Introduction
We start by stating a purely linear algebra problem:
Problem 48. Let m,n be integers and F be any field. Let A,S,B be matrices having entries in
F of dimensions m×m, m× n and n× n respectively. Give necessary and sufficient conditions
for the F-linear span of {AiSBj}i,j∈N to be equal to the whole matrix space Fm×n.
A solution to this problem will be provided in Section 5.3.
Starting with Section 5.4 we will assume that the base field F represents the finite field
F = Fq having cardinality q. Under these conditions and the conditions that gcd(m,n) = 1 and
the characteristic polynomials of the matrices A and B are irreducible we are able to show in
Section 5.4 that {AiSBj}i,j∈N spans the whole vector space Fm×n as soon as S 6= 0.
In Section 5.5 we will prove that whenever the set {AiSBj}i,j∈N spans the whole matrix
ring as a vector space over the finite field F, we are able to explicitly compute the cardinality
F[A]SF[B]. A particular instance of this computation (i.e. when S is the identity matrix and
A, B have irreducible characteristic polynomial) has already been approached via inequalities
in [6].
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5.2 Notation and Preliminaries
Let F be a field and denote by 〈S〉F the linear span over F of a set S of elements in some F-vector
space. Entries, rows and columns of matrices are indexed by integers starting from zero; In and,
respectively, 0m×n denote the n× n identity matrix and the m× n zero matrix — indices may
be omitted when no ambiguity arises.
Moreover, given M ∈ Fn×n,
• the minimal polynomial µM of M is the monic generator of the ideal {p(s) ∈ F[s] :
p(M) = 0};
• the characteristic polynomial of M is χM (s) = det(sI −M);
• EM is the set of eigenvalues of M , i.e., the zeros of χM in some field extension of F;
• LλM and RλM are the left and, respectively, right eigenspaces of M associated with λ ∈ EM ;
• LM =
⋃
λ∈EM
LλM \{0} and RM =
⋃
λ∈EM
RλM \{0} are the sets of left and, respectively, right
eigenvectors of M .
• M is cyclic (or non-derogatory) if one of the following equivalent conditions holds true:
– µM = χM ;
– M is similar to a companion matrix;
– each eigenspace of M has dimension 1, i.e., every eigenvector has geometric multi-
plicity 1.
The definition of the Kronecker product and some of its properties are given next. More
details may be found in [21, Section 12.1].
Definition 49. The Kronecker product of matrices M ∈ Fm×p and N ∈ Fn×q is the block
matrix
M ⊗N = [mi,jN ]0≤i<m,0≤j<p ∈ Fmn×pq,
representing the tensor product of the linear maps corresponding to M and N . Therefore, it
satisfies the property
(M ⊗N)(P ⊗Q) = MP ⊗NQ, (5.1)
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whenever the matrix products on the right side can be computed.
The (column) vectorization of M is the (column) vector col(M) ∈ Fmp formed by stack-
ing the columns of M . Note that col : Fm×p → Fmp is an isomorphism of F-vector spaces,
establishing a correspondence between entry (i, j) of M and entry i+mj of col(M).
Using this notation, given three matrices M,X,N of suitable dimensions,
col(MXN) = (N>⊗M) col(X). (5.2)
5.3 A basis for the vector space of m× n matrices
Let matrices A, B, and S as in Problem 48 and define
VA,B;S = 〈{AiSBj}i,j≥0〉F.
In this and in the following section, conditions will be given that ensure that the dimension of
VA,B;S is maximal, i.e., equal to mn.
Theorem 50. Let A ∈ Fm×m, B ∈ Fn×n, and S ∈ Fm×n and consider the following conditions:
VA,B;S = Fm×n; (5.3)
A and B are cyclic; (5.4)
uSv 6= 0, ∀u ∈ LA, v ∈ RB . (5.5)
Then, (5.3) ⇔ ((5.4) and (5.5)).
Proof. The proof of the theorem is given in [34].
Remark 51. The previous theorem has also an impact in Cryptography since it gives necessary
and sufficient conditions for the attack in [31, Section 3] to be performed in provable polynomial
time.
Example 52. Consider the following matrices, with m,n ≥ 2:
A=
 0 0
Im−1 0
∈Fm×m, B=
0 In−1
0 0
∈Fn×n, S=
1 0
0 0(m−1)×(n−1)
∈Fm×n.
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Both A andB are already in (left and right, respectively) Jordan canonical form. Therefore, their
only eigenvalue is λ = 0, they are nilpotent and cyclic with minimal polynomials µA(s) = s
m
and µB(s) = s
n, and their eigenspaces are generated by u =
[
1 0 · · · 0
]
(left eigenvector
of A) and v =
[
1 0 · · · 0
]>
(right eigenvector of B).
Even though S has rank 1, uSv = 1 6= 0, whence conditions (5.4) and (5.5) of Theorem 50
are satisfied. Therefore, F–linear combinations of matrices Ei,j = AiSBj , with 0 ≤ i < m and
0 ≤ j < n, generate Fm×n for any field F.
Indeed, it is straightforward to check that each Ei,j is one of the mn elements of the canonical
basis of Fm×n, having its unique nonzero entry, equal to 1, at position (i, j). In other words,
col(Ei,j) is the i+mj-th vector of the canonical basis of Fmn.
To the authors’ knowledge, equality (5.3) and the kind of equivalent conditions that were
presented in Theorem 50 have not been considered in the literature before (not even when
m = n: see, for instance, the survey [19] containing a small section about spanning sets of
matrix algebras).
When conditions (5.4) and (5.5) of Theorem 50 are not satisfied, matrices AiSBj , with
0 ≤ i < m and 0 ≤ j < n, are linearly dependent. However, something more can be said about
the dimension of the space they generate.
The general case demands an extremely complicated notation: only the case of cyclic and
diagonalizable matrices A and B will be considered in this chapter.
Theorem 53. Let S ∈ Fm×n and suppose that A ∈ Fm×m and B ∈ Fn×n are cyclic and
diagonalizable. In particular, be U ∈ Em×m and V ∈ En×n two invertible matrices, in some
extension field E of F, such that UAU−1 and V −1BV are diagonal.
Then, the dimension of VA,B;S, is equal to the number of nonzero entries of USV .
Before proving Theorem 53, we introduce the necessary notation and state a fundamental
lemma.
Given A ∈ Fm×m, B ∈ Fn×n, and S ∈ Fm×n, let ri,j = col(AiSBj) and define
RA,B;S =
[
r0,0 r1,0 · · · rm−1,0 r0,1 r1,1 · · · rm−1,n−1
]
∈ Fmn×mn. (5.6)
Then, given v ∈ Fn, diag(v) ∈ Fn×n is the diagonal matrix defined by the components of v.
Moreover, let diag(M) = diag
(
col(M)
)
for any matrix M .
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Finally, let xn =
[
1 x · · · xn−1
]
and be Vnx1,...,xk the matrix whose rows are xn1 , . . . , xnk .
Lemma 54. Let A ∈ Fm×m, B ∈ Fn×n, and S ∈ Fm×n. Suppose that uh ∈ LαhA , 0 ≤ h < s,
and vk ∈ LβkB , 0 ≤ k < t, are the rows and, respectively, columns of matrices U ∈ Es×m and
V ∈ En×t in a suitable extension field E of F. Then,
(V >⊗ U)RA,B;S = diag(USV )(Vnβ1,...,βt ⊗ Vmα1,...,αs). (5.7)
Proof. Observe that, for any row uh of U and column vk of V , there exist αh ∈ EA and βk ∈ EB
such that uh ∈ LαhA and vk ∈ RβkB . Thus,
(v>k ⊗ uh) col(AiSBj) = uhAiSBjvk = uhSvk αihβjk
and, from (5.6), it follows that
(v>k ⊗ uh)RA,B;S = uhSvk
(
β
n
k ⊗ αmh
)
.
Stacking up all these equalities, we get equation (5.7).
Remark 55. Using Lemma 54, implication (5.3) ⇒ (5.5) of Theorem 50 can be proved in a
much simpler way.
Indeed, suppose that the nonzero left-eigenvector u ∈ LαA and right-eigenvector v ∈ RβB
satisfy uSv = 0. Then, taking U = u and V = v in formula (5.7), we get
(v>⊗ u)RA,B;S = (uSv)(βn ⊗ αm) = 0,
showing that RA,B;S does not have full rank. Therefore, its columns col(A
iSBj) are linearly
dependent and the set of matrices AiSBj cannot generate Fm×n.
Proof of Theorem 53. Let αh, 0 ≤ h < m and βk, 0 ≤ k < n, be the left eigenvalues of A
associated with the rows of U and, respectively, the right eigenvalues of B associated with the
columns of V.
Since A and B are cyclic and diagonalizable, they have no repeated eigenvalues, whence
Vmα1,...,αs and Vnβ1,...,βn are invertible Vandermonde matrices.
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By Lemma 54, we have that
(V >⊗ U)RA,B;S = diag(USV )(Vnβ1,...,βn ⊗ Vmα1,...,αs),
where both Kronecker products are invertible. So, rankRA,B;S = rank diag(USV ), which is
equal to the number of nonzero entries of USV .
Since by definition (5.7), the (column) rank of RA,B;S is equal to the dimension of the space
spanned by AiSBj , the proof is concluded.
5.4 The irreducible case
For the remainder of the chapter we will assume that F = Fq represents the finite field of order
q.
The main result of this section will provide a necessary and sufficient condition for matri-
ces A, B having irreducible characteristic polynomial which guarantees that condition (5.3) of
Theorem 50 holds true:
Theorem 56. Let F be a finite field, A ∈ Fm×m, S ∈ Fm×n and B ∈ Fn×n. Suppose that A
and B have irreducible characteristic polynomials. Then,
VA,B;S = Fm×n,∀S 6= 0 if and only if gcd(m,n) = 1.
Proof. Define the F-linear map
ψ : Fm×n →Fm×n
Z = [zi,j ] 7→
∑
0≤i<m
0≤j<n
zi,jA
iSBj
(5.8)
and note that VA,B;S is the image of ψ. Therefore, we need to prove that kerψ = {0},∀S 6=
0⇔ gcd(m,n) = 1. By (5.2) we obtain that
col
(
ψ(Z)
)
= col
 ∑
0≤i<m
0≤j<n
zi,jA
iSBj
 = ∑
0≤i<m
0≤j<n
zi,j(B
j)>⊗Ai col(S).
Hence, by injectivity of col, it follows that ψ is injective (for any choice of S 6= 0) if and only if
51
the kernel of matrix M =
∑
0≤i<m,0≤j<n zi,j(B
j)>⊗Ai is trivial, i.e., M has no zero eigenvalues
whenever Z 6= 0.
Observe first that, by the assumptions on A and B, the matrix rings F[A] and F[B] are fields.
Moreover, all eigenvalue α ∈ EA and β ∈ EB have F-linearly independent powers up to degree
m− 1 and, respectively, n− 1, being F(α) ∼= F[A] and F(β) ∼= F[B], which are Galois extensions
of F of degree m and, respectively, n.
By a classical result on Kronecker products (see, e.g., [21, Theorem 1, p. 411] for F = R,
whose generalization to finite fields is straightforward) the set of eigenvalues of M is
EM =

∑
0≤i<m
0≤j<n
zi,jα
iβj : α ∈ EA, β ∈ EB
 , (5.9)
where all eigenvalues are considered as elements in some common field extension.
So, kerψ = {0} if and only if each sum in (5.9) is nonzero. In other words, for any two α ∈ EA
and β ∈ EB , the products {αiβj}i<m,j<n are F-linearly independent. By [8, Proposition 5.1 and
Theorem 5.5], this condition is equivalent to
F(α) ∩ F(β) = F.
Since the intersection of F(α) and F(β) is the field extension of F of degree gcd(m,n) (see [23,
Theorem 2.6]), the proof is concluded.
5.5 The cardinality of subsets of F[A]SF[B]
In this section we will explicitly compute the cardinality of the set F[A]SF[B] whose relevance
in Cryptography is discussed in [6, 26]. Define the space of polynomials
Pk[s] = {p(s) ∈ F[s] : deg p < k}, k = 0, 1, . . .
being, for instance, P0 = {0} and P1 = F.
Note that, given a square matrix M with d = degµM ,
P0[M ] ⊂ P1[M ] ⊂ · · · ⊂ Pd−1[M ] ⊂ Pd[M ] = Pk[M ], ∀k ≥ d.
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The main objective of this section consists in calculating the cardinality of the set
Mh,kA,B;S = Ph[A]SPk[B] ⊆ Fm×n.
Theorem 57. Let A ∈ Fm×m, B ∈ Fn×n, and S ∈ Fm×n such that VA,B;S = Fm×n. Then, for
any 0 ≤ h ≤ m and 0 ≤ k ≤ n,
∣∣∣Mh,kA,B;S∣∣∣ = (qh − 1)(qk − 1)q − 1 + 1.
In order to demonstrate this statement, some specific notation and one preparatory lemma
are needed.
First, for every h ≤ m, let
Fh;m = {x ∈ Fm : xi = 0,∀i = h, . . . ,m− 1},
being therefore Fh ∼= Fh;m ⊆ Fm. Define, for every h ≤ m and k ≤ n, the bilinear map
φh,k :Fh;m × Fk;n→Fm×n
(x, y) 7→xy>
(5.10)
and, for the sake of simplicity, denote its image by
Φh,k = φh,k(Fh;m × Fk;n). (5.11)
Lemma 58. Let A, B, and S as in Theorem 57. Then
∣∣∣Mh,kA,B;S∣∣∣ = |Φh,k|.
Proof. Consider the map ψ defined in (5.8). We claim that ψ(Φh,k) = Mh,kA,B;S . Actually, for
every M ∈Mh,kA,B;S , there exist (x, y) ∈ Fh;m × Fk;n ⊆ Fm × Fn such that
M =
( ∑
0≤i<h
xiA
i
)
S
( ∑
0≤j<k
yjB
j
)
=
∑
0≤i<m
0≤j<n
xiyjA
iSBj = ψ(xy>) ∈ ψ(Φh,k).
Therefore,
∣∣∣Mh,kA,B;S∣∣∣ ≤ |Φh,k|. Moreover, when VA,B;S = Fm×n, ψ is injective and so Φh,k ↔
Mh,kA,B;S .
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Observe that this lemma shows that the cardinality of Mh,kA,B;S is independent of the choice
of A, B, and S when condition (5.3) is met.
The problem is now reduced to the computation of the cardinality of Φh,k, defined in (5.11).
Proof of Theorem 57. Consider again the map φh,k, defined in (5.10), and observe that
Fh;m × Fk;n = (φh,k)−1(Φh,k) =
⋃
Z∈Φh,k
(φh,k)−1(Z).
Consequently, since the inverse images are disjoint,
qhqk = |Fh;m × Fk;n| =
∣∣∣∣∣ ⋃
Z∈Φh,k
(φh,k)−1(Z)
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∑
Z∈Φh,k
|(φh,k)−1(Z)|.
To compute the value of the summation, we have to consider two situations.
• When Z = 0, φ(x, y) = xy>= 0 if and only if all the products of each component of x and
each component of y are zero if and only if x = 0 and y = 0 (1 case), x = 0 and y 6= 0
(qk − 1 cases), or x 6= 0 and y = 0 (qh − 1 cases). Therefore, |φ−1(0)| = qh + qk − 1.
• If Z 6= 0, observe that, by the bilinearity of φh,k, φh,k(x, y) = φh,k(αx, α−1y) for every
α ∈ F \ {0}.
On the other hand, if φh,k(x, y) = φh,k(x˜, y˜) then x˜ = αx and y˜ = α−1y for some α 6= 0.
Indeed, considering only the indexes i and j such that xiyj = x˜iy˜j 6= 0, we get that
xi
x˜i
=
y˜j
yj
.
By the independency of the indices, it follows that α = xix˜i =
y˜j
yj
for every i, j. So, we
conclude that |(φh,k)−1(Z)| = |F \ {0}| = q − 1.
Putting all together,
qhqk = |(φh,k)−1(0)|+
∑
Z∈Φh,k\{0}
∣∣(φh,k)−1(Z)∣∣
= qh + qk − 1 +
∑
Z∈Φh,k\{0}
(q − 1) = qh + qk − 1 + (|Φh,k| − 1)(q − 1),
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whence
|Φh,k| = q
hqk − qh − qk + 1
q − 1 + 1 =
(qh − 1)(qk − 1)
q − 1 + 1.
Finally, the claim follows by Lemma 58.
5.6 Cryptanalysis of a noncommutative key exchange pro-
tocol
In this section we give an application of the results previously proved. An interesting devel-
opment in the direction of a non commutative based scheme is provided in the sided action
described in [26] (an attack to a certain instance based on semirings is also presented in [48]).
Some cryptosystems relying on those ideas are implemented in [1] and [40] and in the patent
US7184551. In this section we provide the cryptanalysis of these three schemes using the results
in the previous sections. We first describe the noncommutative key exchange presented in [1]
and [40]. Consider the group GLn(Fq) of invertible matrices of order n over the finite field Fq
and M1,M2 ∈ GLn(Fq) such that M1M2 6= M2M1. Let the public key be (GLn(Fq),M1,M2).
• Alice chooses (a1, a2) ∈ Z2 and sends C1 = Ma11 Ma22 to Bob
• Bob chooses (b1, b2) ∈ Z2 and sends C2 = M b11 C1M b22 to Alice
• Alice computes K = M−a11 C2M−a22
As a result Alice and Bob can compute the secret key K = M b11 M
b2
2 . The purpose of this
section is to show that K can be computed in O(n3) field operations from C1 and C2.
5.6.1 Preliminaries
Cayley-Hamilton Theorem
Let M ∈ GLn(Fq) and fM be the characteristic polynomial of M . Then fM (M) = 0. As a
result every power of M can be written in terms of a linear combination of {1,M, . . . ,Mn−1}
where n is the order of the matrix. A nice proof of this is presented in [29, p.21].
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Solving homogeneous “mixed” multivariate polynomial equations of degree 2
In general solving multivariate polynomial equations is NP-complete [9]. In situations where
the number of variables is much smaller than the number of equations there exists a polynomial
time algorithm. To be precise: in [9] the authors proposed an “expected” polynomial time
algorithm (eXtended Linearization) to solve overdefined polynomial equations when the number
of unknowns k and the number of equations m satisfy the inequality m ≥ εk2 where ε ∈ (0, 12 ].
The expected running time is approximately of k
O( 1√
ε
)
. A few years after publication of XL, it
has been realized that the algorithm can be regarded as a weak form of the F4 algorithm [12]. In
our context we will use XL, since it will be more suitable for a direct application. In particular
our approach will use a specialized version of XL that can be proved to lead to a polynomial
time algorithm that breaks the protocols described in [1] and [40] in the generic condition. For
all other cases we refer to the heuristic result in [9] that, for cryptanalytic purposes, will be
enough.
Commutative rings of matrices
Let Mn×n(Fq) be the algebra of n×n matrices over Fq. Let T be an invertible matrix and define
Fq[T ] to be the Fq-algebra generated by T . In other words Fq[T ] is the image of the evaluation
map
ψ : Fq[x] −→Mn×n(Fq)
ψ(p(x)) := p(T ).
By Cayley-Hamilton theorem it follows that Fq[T ] is a finite dimensional algebra over Fq. The
following short lemma will be useful for our purposes.
Lemma 59. Let p(T ) ∈ Fq[T ] ∩GLn(Fq) =: (Fq[T ])∗ and
C(T ) := {L ∈ GLn(Fq) | LT = TL}.
Then p(T )−1 ∈ C(T ).
Proof.
p(T )−1T = (T−1p(T ))−1 = (p(T )T−1)−1 = Tp(T )−1
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5.6.2 Performing the attack
The attack described in the following sections makes use of the elementary tools mentioned above
and this is intended to show the structural vulnerabilities of the system. Suppose Eve is observ-
ing the key exchange, she is then able to get the following information: {M1,M2,Ma11 Ma22 ,Ma1+b11 Ma2+b22 }.
Eve first observes Ma11 ∈ Fq[M1] and Ma22 ∈ Fq[M2] and that Ma11 Ma22 is in the image of the
application
ϕ : Fq[M1]× Fq[M2] −→Mn×n(Fq)
ϕ(h1(M1), h2(M2)) = h1(M1)h2(M2).
Then, we are able to write Ma11 M
a2
2 = p(M1)q(M2), for some p(x), q(x) ∈ Fq[x] with
p(M1) =
n−1∑
i=0
xiM
i
1 , q(M2) =
n−1∑
j=0
yjM
j
2
and then
Ma11 M
a2
2 =
n−1∑
i=0, j=0
xiyjM
i
1M
j
2 (5.12)
where xi, yj are indeterminates. Observe that the system is solvable in polynomial time with
m = n2, k = 2n and ε = 14 and expected running time O(n
2) (in the notation of [9]). We pick
now any solution and write down p(M1) and q(M2).
Remark 60. The system given by Equation (5.12) is easy to solve, again even without the
knowledge of the algorithm presented in [9] since they consist of n2 homogeneous equations of
degree 2 in 2n unknowns where we can perform a Gaussian elimination-like computation on
the variables ui,j := xiyj . We will show those equations with an explicit example in the next
subsection. It is also elementary to observe that when the n2 by n2 matrix of the linear system
∑
i,j
ui,jM
i
1M
j
2 = M
a1
1 M
a2
2
is invertible, the attack can be proven to be polynomial by the observation that the ui,j are
unique and the system xiyj = ui,j admits a solution by construction (that can be found just
by substitutions). In particular this happens when we have the non degenerate case, in the
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sense that the k-vector space generated by the M iN j is the whole matrix ring; a necessary and
sufficient condition for this to happen have already been described previously in the chapter.
Remark 61.
• We have at least one solution by the observation Ma11 Ma22 ∈ imgϕ.
• We are not claiming p(M1) = Ma11 and q(M2) = Ma22 . It has been observed in [26] that
in order to break the protocol it is enough to find U ∈ Fq[M1] and V ∈ Fq[M2] such that
U = Ma11 and V = M
a2
2 .
• Since M1,M2 are invertible, also p(M1) and q(M2) are.
• Ma11 Ma22 = p(M1)q(M2) implies
(p(M1)
−1Ma11 )(M
a2
2 q(M2)
−1) = 1.
Eve gets the key thanks to the computation
p(M1)
−1Ma1+b11 M
a2+b2
2 q(M2)
−1 =
p(M1)
−1M b11 M
a1
1 M
a2
2 M
b2
2 q(M2)
−1 =
M b11 (p(M1)
−1Ma11 )(M
a2
2 q(M2)
−1)M b22 =
M b11 (p(M1)
−1Ma11 M
a2
2 q(M2)
−1)M b22 =
M b11 · 1 ·M b22 = M b11 M b22 = K,
where the second equality is due to lemma 59 and the very last one by the solution of the system
(5.12).
5.6.3 Cryptanalysis of the public key patented variant of the protocol
In this section we cryptanalise the patent US7184551.
Brief description
Public key
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• Alice chooses A,C ∈ GLk(Zn) for n = pq and p, q prime numbers
• B = CAC and G ∈ Zn[C]
• Alice publishes (A,B,G)
Encryption
• Bob chooses D ∈ Zn[G]
• Bob computes K = DBD and E = DAD
• Let M be the message in GLk(Zn)
• Bob sends (KM,E)
Decryption
• Alice computes CEC = K
• Alice decrypts as K−1KM
Cryptanalysis
The idea behind this cryptanalysis is the same as in the previous sections, we just need to make
a revision of what it has already been done earlier in this section. In what follows we prove
that factoring the modulus is enough to break the protocol, since any latter computation can
be performed in polynomial time. Informally, the presented cryptanalysis is meant to show that
in US7184551 matrices do not provide additional security features than integers. In addition,
observe that the protocol is roughly k2 times more expensive than RSA [43] in terms of memory
(where k is the order of the matrices). If M ∈ Mk×k(Zn), let Mp and Mq denote its two
reductions modulo p and q respectively. We reduce G, E and A modulo p and write the system
Ep =
k−1∑
j=0
xjG
j
p
Ap(k−1∑
i=0
xiG
j
p
)
(5.13)
in k unknowns and k2 homogeneous degree 2 equations over Fkp. We can assure at least one
solution by the construction of Ep = DpApDp, since Dp can be written in terms of low powers
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of G. We apply again the algorithm presented in [9] getting one solution for the system in
polynomial time with ε = 1/2. This solution identifies a matrix D′ ∈ Fp[G] ⊆ Fp[C] such that
D′ApD′ = DpApDp = Ep mod p.
Observe that we get the partial secret key Kp = K mod p by multiplying Bp on both sides by
D′
D′BpD′ = D′CpApCpD′ = CpD′ApD′Cp = CpDpApDpCp = Kp mod p. (5.14)
We perform the same procedure modulo q getting D′′ ∈ Fq[G] ⊆ Fq[C] such that D′′BqD′′ = Kq.
Since we have the computable isomorphism of rings
ψ : Mk×k(Zn) −→Mk×k(Fp)⊕Mk×k(Fq)
given by the Chinese Remainder Theorem we are able to recover the secret key K just by taking
the preimage of the pair (Kp,Kq) through ψ. Note that ψ
−1(Kp,Kq) is exactly K by observing
that Kp and Kq are necessarily the reductions of K modulo p and q (by the homomorphism
properties of ψ) and then that K = ψ−1(Kp,Kq) since ψ is a bijection. In this procedure it is
important to observe that both D′ and D′′ are guaranteed to exists thanks to the fact that Dp
and Dq exist by construction and they are in the algebra generated by G. Once again, recall
that D′ (resp D′′) is not guaranteed to equal Dp (resp. Dq), while K will always be correct
thanks to equation (5.14).
Remark 62. Observe that the equations in (5.13) are even easier than the ones in (5.12) since
they have the same structure but half of the unknowns. What is again important to observe is
that Cayley Hamilton theorem always assures us a solution. In the next subsection we give an
example to show how they look like.
60
Example
Let n = 61133 = 541 · 113 and Alice’s public key constructed as follows: let C be
 243 112
234 233

and
A =
 121 231
144 242

then
CAC = B =
 36124 40493
39554 16490
 .
Then we choose
G = 14 · 1 + 3374 · C =
 25167 11090
55920 52560
 .
The public key will be (A,B,G). Bob secret key is constructed as follows: Let
D = 34125 · 1 + 7123G =
 56710 10234
36665 40513

K =
 20609 51651
14785 1448

and
E = DAD =
 57174 14133
7237 20711
 .
Let M be any message, then Bob sends
(KM,E).
61
Eve attacks the system as follows: she reduces E modulo 541 getting
E541 =
 369 67
204 153
 .
She has now to solve the system
(x1 + yG541)A541(x1 + yG541) = E541
getting for example the solution (x0, y0) = (220, 159), so we get K541 = (x01+y0G541)B541(x01+
y0G541) and then
K541 =
 51 256
178 366
 .
Analogously one gets K113 = (x01+y0G113)B113(x01+y0G113) where (x0, y0) = (55, 49), getting
K113 =
 43 10
95 92
 .
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem we get
K =
 20609 51651
14785 1448
 .
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Chapter 6
Linearized Subfield Preserving
maps
In this chapter we address the subfield preserving question of chapter 4 for the case of linear
maps over finite fields. The results in this chapter are published in [30].
6.1 Introduction
In [3] the group structure of q-linear permutation polynomials of Fqm having coefficients over
the subfield Fqd is provided. It is then natural to ask which is the monoid structure of q-linear
canonical subfield preserving polynomials (of parameters (qd,m)). In this chapter, in order
to establish that monoid structure, we will use techniques from group and semigroup theory,
linear algebra, commutative and non commutative ring theory and module theory. Indeed, the
purposes we aim at, are not just getting new results, but also showing that classical finite field
theoretic propositions can be easily obtained by using more general frameworks (as it happens
for example in the case of Theorem 75, in comparison with the same result in [38, Theorem 3.8]
and [38, Theorem 3.1]).
It follows a brief outline of the chapter. In Section 6.1.1 some preliminary definitions and
notations are given. In Section 6.2 some elementary linear algebra propositions that will be
useful in many of the following sections are proved. In Section 6.2.1 some monoid and group
structures relative to restrictions of coefficients to some intermediate extensions between Fq and
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Fqm are provided.
6.1.1 Notation
Let d be a positive integer and let R be a commutative ring, let us denote by Matd(R) the ring
of d × d matrices having entries in R. Let GLd(R) be the multiplicative group of invertible
elements of Matd(R) and GL1(R) by R
∗.
Let M be a module over R, let us denote EndR(M) the ring of endomorphisms of M as an
R-module. Moreover, if G is a group we denote by Aut(G) the group of automorphisms of G as
a group.
If S is any ring (possibly noncommutative), denote by Z(S) the center of S. Let k be a field.
In this section, all the vector spaces will be finite dimensional, and, if T is an endomorphism
of a k-vector space V , let us denote pTchar(x) and p
T
min(x) the characteristic polynomial and the
minimal polynomial of T , respectively.
The reader should pay attention to the fact that, if W ⊆ V are vector spaces, then we denote
by V \W the difference of V and W as sets and by V/W the quotient as vector spaces. Let
now T ∈ Endk(V ) be such that T (W ) ⊆ W , then we denote the restriction of T to W by T|W
and the induced application on V/W as piVW (T ).
6.2 Preliminary definitions
Let V be a finite dimensional k-vector space and W be a subspace of V .
Definition 63. Define:
A(V,W ) := {f ∈ End k(V ) | f(W ) ⊆W}.
S(V,W ) := {f ∈ A(V,W ) | f(V \W ) ⊆ V \W}.
Let now T ∈ A(V,W ) and set
CV (T ) := {f ∈ End k(V ) | f ◦ T = T ◦ f}
We say that W is T -closed if gcd(p
T|W
min (x), p
piVW (T )
min (x)) = 1.
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Remark 64. Observe that A(V,W ) is obviously a k-algebra and S(V,W ) is just a monoid
under composition. Moreover we have the following
S(V,W ) = {f ∈ A(V,W ) | piVW (f) ∈ Aut k(V/W )}.
For the sake of completeness let us prove the following linear algebra lemma:
Lemma 65. Let T ∈ A(V,W ) and W being T -closed. Then pT|Wmin (x)ppi
V
W (T )
min (x) = p
T
min(x).
Proof. First observe that both p
T|W
min (x) and p
piVW (T )
min (x) divide p
T
min(x). Now, since they have
greatest common divisor equal to 1, then their product divides pTmin(x). In addition
∀v ∈ V pT|Wmin (T )ppi
V
W (T )
min (T )(v) = p
T|W
min (T )
(
p
piVW (T )
min (T )(v)
)
= 0
since p
piVW (T )
min (T )(v) ∈W .
For any F ∈ A(V,W ), let us denote piVW (F ) = piF whenever V and W are clear from the
context.
Proposition 66. Let T ∈ A(V,W ) and W be T -closed. Then:
R := CV (T ) ∩A(V,W ) ∼= CW (T|W )× CV/W (piVW (T ))
as k-algebras.
Proof. Let
ψ : R→ CW (T|W )× CV/W (piVW (T ))
be defined by ψ(f) := (f|W , pif); Let us now prove that ψ is an injection. Let ψ(f) = 0 for
some f ∈ R. Therefore we have that f satisfies f(W ) = 0 and f(V ) ⊆ W . Observe that
the operator ppiTmin(T|W ) is invertible if and only if it is invertible in k[T|W ], which is true, since
gcd(ppiTmin(x), p
T|W
min (x)) = 1. Indeed
∀v ∈ V ppiTmin(T|W )(f(v)) = ppiTmin(T )(f(v)) = f(ppiTmin(T )(v)) = 0
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where the last equality follows since p
piVW (T )
min (T )(v) ∈ W , as we already observed previously.
Now, since ppiTmin(T|W ) is invertible, we have f(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
Let now (f, g) ∈ CW (T|W ) × CV/W (piVW (T )). In order to prove the surjectivity, we first
observe that the morphisms
·|W : R −→ CW (T|W )
and
pi : R −→ CV/W (piVW (T ))
are both surjective. Thanks to the T -closure of W , it is easy to observe that both ppiTmin(T|W ) and
p
T|W
min (piT ) are invertible respectively on W and V/W . Let h ∈ R such that h|W = f ·ppiTmin(T|W )−1
and let l ∈ R such that pil = g · pT|Wmin (piT )−1. Therefore
ψ(h · ppiTmin(T ) + l · pT|Wmin (T )) = (h|W · ppiTmin(T|W ), (pil) · p
T|W
min (piT ))
= (f · ppiTmin(T|W )−1ppiTmin(T|W ), g · pT|Wmin (piT )−1)p
T|W
min (piT )) = (f, g).
Proposition 67. Let T ∈ A(V,W ) and W be T -closed. Then it holds:
CV (T ) ∩ S(V,W ) ∼= CW (T|W )× CV/W (piVW (T ))∗ (6.1)
as monoids.
Proof. Observe that the composition law in the monoid CV (T ) ∩ S(V,W ) is the same as the
multiplication in the algebra R. Moreover we have the canonical embedding CV (T )∩S(V,W ) ⊆
CV (T ) ∩A(V,W ). Therefore the claim is obtained by looking at the image of the LHS of (6.1)
through the map ψ defined in Proposition 66. Now, applying Remark 64 we get the thesis.
We now compute the centralizer algebra of a linear application T satisfying a suitable prop-
erty.
Proposition 68. Let U be a vector space and T ∈ End k(U) such that U ∼= k[T ]d as a k[T ]-
module for some d ∈ N. Then CU (T ) ∼= Matd(k[T ]) as Fq algebras.
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Proof. By the standard theory of modules over rings we have
End k(U) ⊇ CU (T ) = End k[T ](U) ∼= End k[T ](k[T ]d) = Mat d(k[T ]).
6.2.1 Coefficients constraints for monoid structures
In this section we set up the problem we want to solve in terms of the linear algebra setting
we developed before. Let q be a power of a prime p, m ∈ N∗ and d be a divisor of m. Write
m = dptn where gcd(p, n) = 1 and n′ := ptn.
Definition 69. Let d and m be positive integers such that d|m. We say that the extension
Fqd ⊆ Fqm is degenerate if p = char(Fq) divides m/d.
Let Fqm be the finite field of order qm and φq be the Frobenius morphism. Let V = Fqm and
W = Fqdpt considered as Fq-vector spaces. Let us fix an Fq-normal basis B for Fqm , i.e. a basis
of the form
B := {α, αq, . . . αqm−1}.
The existence of such a basis is guaranteed by the normal basis theorem [24, Theorem 2.35].
For j ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, define
Bj = {αqj , αqj+d , . . . , αqj+(n
′−1)d}
and Vj as the Fq-span of Bj .
Remark 70. It is elementary to observe that
V =
d−1⊕
j=0
Vj
as Fq-vector spaces and also as Fq[φqd ]-modules.
Denote by Wj the Fq-vector space Vj ∩ Fqdpt .
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Lemma 71. A basis for Wj consists of
Hj = {
n−1∑
k=0
αq
j+kdpt+id}i∈{0,...,pt−1}.
Proof. Let Uj be the span of Hj . Clearly Uj ⊆ Wj since the elements of Hj belong to Wj ,
therefore, if the set H =
⊔d−1
j=0 Hj consists of p
td linearly independent vectors we finished:
Indeed, since Fqdpt =
⊕d−1
j=0 Wj , no inclusion Uj ⊆ Wj can be proper. It remains then to prove
the linear independence of the vectors in H. Assume
d−1∑
j=0
pt−1∑
i=0
li,j
n−1∑
k=0
αq
j+kdpt+id
= 0.
We now prove that all the indices j + kdpt + id are distinct for any k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and any
j ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}, the result will follow since the αqs ’s are independent for s ∈ {0, . . .m − 1}.
Consider the index γ for which we have
γ = j + kdpt + id = j + kdpt + id.
γ has a unique remainder j in the division by d, it follows j = j. Now we cancel out j and then
d in the equation above; we now use the same argument to see that k = k and then i = i.
Notice that Wj has dimension p
t for all j’s
Remark 72. Now, using the previous lemma we can observe that
V/W =
d−1⊕
j=0
Vj/Wj
as Fq-vector spaces and also as Fq[φqd ]-modules.
Definition 73. Let d|m. Define
L (q, d,m) := {f : Fqm −→ Fqm | f(z) =
m−1∑
i=0
aiz
qi , ai ∈ Fqd}.
Remark 74. Observe that L (q, d,m) is isomorphic to CV (φqd) since the coefficient property is
given by the property of commuting with φqd , see for example [4]. The linearity property follows
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easily, since all Fq- linear maps from Fqm to itself consist exactly of the q-linearized polynomials
up to degree qm−1.
Let us now give a quick proof of [3, Theorem 3.1] using module theory. We have to warn the
reader that the original proof of [3, Theorem 3.1] by Carlitz et al. is claimed by F. O¨zbudak
to be not correct in [38, Theorem 3.8], where a long but nice proof of the same result is pre-
sented. We in fact show that, in the context of module theory, the proof of the same theorem
is straightforward. Recall that n′ = npt (with gcd(n, pt) = 1) and then m = n′d.
Theorem 75. CFqm (φqd)
∼= Matd
(
Fq[z]/(zn
′ − 1)
)
as Fq-algebras. In particular we have
L (q, d,m) ∼= Mat d(Fq[z]/(zn′ − 1)).
Proof. Let R := Fq[z]/(zn
′ − 1). First observe that R ∼= Fq[φqd ] since zn′ − 1 is the minimal
polynomial for φqd . It is enough to check that for every j ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1} we have R ∼= Vj as
Fq[φqd ] modules, it will then follow that
Rd ∼=
d−1⊕
j=0
Vj
as an Fq[φqd ] module, so that we can apply Proposition 68 with U = Fqm and T = φqd .
The required j-th isomorphism is given by
ξj : R −→ Vj
ξj(1) := α
qj
ξj(p(z)) := p(φqd)(α
qj ).
It is elementary to check that ξj is an isomorphism of R-modules.
Corollary 76. It holds:
CFqm/Fqdpt
(φqd) ∼= Mat d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)pt
 .
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Proof. Let R′ = Fq [z]
(
∑n−1
i=0 z
i)
pt
. Observe that Wj is an R-submodule of Vj with the same action
as Theorem 75. Let ξj be as in Theorem 75, define the surjection
ξj : R −→ Vj/Wj
with ξj(p(z)) = [p(φqd)(α
qj )]. We now prove that ξj is also well defined (with the same action)
on R′: Indeed, notice that the kernel of ξj contains
(∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)pt
, since ξj
(∑n−1
i=0 z
ipt
)
∈ Fqdpt
as it is clear from the formula:
[
ξj
(
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t
)]qdpt
− ξj
(
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t
)
= φqdpt
(
ξj
(
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t
))
− ξj
(
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t
)
= ξj
(
zp
t
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t
)
+ ξj
(
−
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t
)
= ξj
(
zp
t
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t −
n−1∑
i=0
zip
t
)
= ξj(z
m − 1) = 0.
Therefore we can now observe that the morphism
ξ
∗
j : R
′ −→ Vj/Wj
is surjective (since ξj is) and injective (since dimFq (R
′) = dimFq (Vj/Wj)). Thus, by Remark 72
we get
V/W =
d−1⊕
j=0
Vj/Wj = (R
′)d
as an Fq[φqd ] module. It follows
CFqm/Fqdpt
(φqd) ∼= Mat d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)pt

using Proposition 68.
Recall that m = n′d.
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Definition 77. Define L(qd, n′) as the set
{f : Fqm → Fqm | f(Fqd) ⊆ Fqd , f(Fqdi \ Fqdj ) ⊆ Fqdi \ Fqdj for i, j|n′}.
We say that f is qd-canonical linearized subfield preserving if it belongs to the setT (q, d,m) :=
L(qd, n′) ∩L (q, d,m).
Remark 78. Observe that T (q, d,m) is a monoid under composition since L(qd, n′) and
L (q, d,m) are.
Let now W ′ = Fqd . Before going into the proof of the main theorem, let us give a character-
ization of the subfield preserving setting in the case of linearized polynomials with coefficients
in a subfield.
Lemma 79. Let f ∈ Fqd [x] be Fq-linear. Then it holds
f ∈ T (q, d,m)⇐⇒ piVW ′f ∈ Aut Fq (Fqm/Fqd).
Proof. First observe that f is well defined (for any l ∈ N) over Fqdl/Fqd , since it has coefficients
over Fqd and then f(Fqd) ⊆ Fqd . Clearly f ∈ T (q, d,m) implies f(Fqm \ Fqd) ⊆ Fqm \ Fqd
by definition of T (q, d,m). Let [α] ∈ Fqm/Fqd : if pif([α]) = 0 then f(α) ∈ Fqd , that implies
[α] = 0.
Let now f be such that piVW ′f ∈ Aut Fq (Fqm/Fqd) and assume (by contradiction) that
There exist l, s ∈ N dividing n′ and α ∈ Fqdl \ Fqds such that f(α) ∈ Fqds .
Therefore, reading the previous proposition modulo Fqd we get
There exist l, s ∈ N dividing n′ and α ∈ FqdlF
qd
\ FqdsF
qd
such that [f(α)] ∈ FqdsF
qd
.
Now, since pif ∈ Aut Fq (Fqm/Fqd) then pif ∈ Aut Fq (Fqds/Fqd) which implies that there exists
β ∈ FqdsF
qd
such that
pif([β]) = pif([α]).
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but [α] 6= [β] by construction, since they lie in different field extensions. The contradiction then
follows from the fact that piVW ′f ∈ Aut Fq (Fqm/Fqd).
We now combine the propositions above to obtain the monoid structure of T (q, d,m).
Theorem 80. Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p. Let t, d, n ∈ N m = ndpt and
gcd(n, p) = 1. It holds
• if t = 0 then
T (q, d,m) ∼= Mat d
(
Fq[z]
(z − 1)
)
×GL d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)

as monoids.
• if t ≥ 1 then
T (q, d,m) ∼= GL d
(
Fq[z]
(z − 1)pt
)
×GL d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)pt
 ∼=
GL d
(
Fq[z]
(zn′ − 1)
)
as groups.
Remark 81. The theorem above states something very strong:
In any degenerate case, there exists no linearized, subfield preserving polynomial with coefficients
over Fqd that is not invertible.
Indeed, the property of preserving the subfields assures the full invertibility of the associated
linear function.
Proof of Theorem 80: First case: t = 0. In this case set W ′ = W = Fqd , n = n′ and T = φqd .
Let us prove first S(V,W ) ∩ CV (T ) = T (q, d,m): If f ∈ S(V,W ) ∩ CV (T ) then
f ∈ CV (T ) = Fqd [x]/(xq
m − x)
(by definition) and piVW f ∈ Aut(V/W ) by Remark 64. Indeed, by Lemma 79, f ∈ T (q, d,m).
Now, using Proposition 67, we have
T (q, d,m) = S(V,W ) ∩ CV (T ) ∼= CW (T|W )× CV/W (piVW (T ))∗.
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Using now Corollary 76 for CV/W (pi
V
W (T ))
∗ and Theorem 75 for CW (T|W ) we get
T (q, d,m) ∼= Mat d
(
Fq[z]
(z − 1)
)
×GL d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)
 .
Second case: t ≥ 1. Set now V = Fqm , W = Fqdpt and T = φqd . Consider the isomorphism of
monoids (obtained as above, using Proposition 67, Theorem 75 and Corollary 76)
Ω : S(V,W ) ∩ CV (T ) −→ L (q, d, ptd)×GL d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)pt
 .
Observe that we have the following inclusion:
T (q, d,m) ⊆ S(V,W ) ∩ CV (T ).
It follows that the isomorphism Ω induces an injection of monoids
Ω : T (q, d,m) ↪→ L (q, d, ptd)×GL d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)pt
 .
Let
• p : L (q, d, ptd) × GL d
(
Fq [z]
(
∑n−1
i=0 z
i)
pt
)
→ L (q, d, ptd) be the projection on the first com-
ponent.
• ResW : T (q, d,m) −→ T (q, d, ptd) be the restriction morphism induced by the inclusion
Fqdpt ⊆ Fqm to .
• ι : T (q, d, ptd) ↪→ L (q, d, ptd) be the inclusion map.
With all this data we construct the following commutative diagram in the category of monoids:
T (q, d,m)
Ω−−−−→ L (q, d, ptd)×GL d
(
Fq [z]
(
∑n−1
i=0 z
i)
pt
)
ResW
y yp
T (q, d, ptd)
ι−−−−→ L (q, d, ptd)
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Let us first show that, if
ι(T (q, d, ptd)) = L (q, d, ptd)∗
we finished: in fact, in this case, consider
T (q, d,m)
Ω−−−−→ L (q, d, ptd)∗×GL d
(
Fq [z]
(
∑n−1
i=0 z
i)
pt
)
ResW
y yp
T (q, d, ptd)
ι−−−−→ L (q, d, ptd)∗
Moreover, we have that, for any two rings R and S, GL d(R×S) = GL d(R)×GL d(S), it follows:
L (q, d, ptd)∗ ×GL d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)pt
 = GL d( Fq[z]
(zn′ − 1)
)
therefore
T (q, d,m) ∼= GL d
(
Fq[z]
(zn′ − 1)
)
∼= L (q, d,m)∗
since Ω is an isomorphism. As a byproduct, we also have T (q, d,m)∗ = T (q, d,m). Therefore,
in order to complete the proof, it is enough to show that T (q, d, ptd) = L (q, d, ptd)∗. The
inclusion L (q, d, ptd)∗ ⊆ T (q, d, ptd) is obvious, in fact we already noticed in the introduction
that every permutation polynomial having coefficients in a subfield is also subfield preserving for
all the proper upper fields. The inclusion T (q, d, ptd) ⊆ L (q, d, ptd)∗ is more tricky. Consider
the following commutative diagram in the category of rings:
L (q, d, ptd)
∆−−−−→ Mat d
(
Fq [z]
(z−1)pt
)
pi
y ypi
piL (q, d, ptd)
∆d−−−−→ Mat d
(
Fq [z]
(z−1)pt−1
)
Above:
• piL (q, d, ptd) ⊆ EndFq (Fqm/Fqd) is the image of the morphism given by f 7→ piVW f , that is
consistent since any f ∈ L (q, d, ptd) has a good reduction pif modulo Fqd , since f(Fqd) ⊆
Fqd .
• ∆ is the isomorphism given by Theorem 75.
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• pi is the extension to the matrix ring of the projection morphism of rings
pi′ :
Fq[z]
(z − 1)pt −→
Fq[z]
(z − 1)pt−1
• ∆d is the isomorphism given by ∆d(pif) = pi(∆(f)), which is well defined since the mini-
mum polynomial of φqd over Fqd is z − 1.
For any f ∈ L (q, d, ptd), the key observation is that:
det(∆d(pif)) = det(pi(∆(f))) = pi
′(det(∆(f))).
Now, if f ∈ T (q, d, ptd) ⊆ L (q, d, ptd), then pif is invertible by Lemma 79. Therefore z − 1
does not divide det(∆d(pif)), from which
z − 1 6 | pi′(det(∆(f)))
Since the ring
Fq [z]
(z−1)pt is local, the previous equation implies directly that
z − 1 6 |det(∆(f)).
Therefore f is invertible, so T (q, d, ptd) = T (q, d, ptd)∗ = L (q, d, ptd)∗
Remark 82. We point out that [3, Theorem 3.1], and [3, Theorem 4.6] can be seen as corollaries
of our Theorem 80. Indeed, in the non degenerate case, it holds:
L (q, d,m)∗ = T (q, d,m)∗ ∼=
Mat d( Fq[z]
(z − 1)
)
×GL d
 Fq[z](∑n−1
i=0 z
i
)
∗ =
GL d
(
Fq[z]
(zn − 1)
)
whereas in the degenerate case we have
T (q, d,m) = T (q, d,m)∗ = L (q, d,m)∗ = GL d
(
Fq[z]
(zn′ − 1)
)
.
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6.2.2 Examples
Let us now give some examples:
Example 83. Let us consider the non degenerate case m = 2 and q = 3, let also d = 1,
t = 0, n = n′ = 2. We have that the monoid of 3-canonical, 3-linearized 2-subfield preserving
polynomials consists of
T (3, 1, 2) = {x, 2x, x3, 2x3, 2x+ x3, x+ 2x3}
that is isomorphic to the monoid
(
F3[z]
(z − 1) ×
(
F3[z]
(z + 1)
)∗
, ·
)
= (F3 × F∗3, ·)
Notice that, as expected in the non degenerate case, we have non invertible elements, i.e. {2x+
x3, x+ 2x3} that correspond to {(0, 1), (0, 2)}.
Example 84. Let us consider the degenerate case m = 4, q = 2, d = 1, t = 2, and pt = 4.
Then we have
T (2, 1, 4) = {x, x2, x4, x+ x2 + x4, x8, x+ x2 + x8, x+ x4 + x8, x2 + x4 + x8}
that is isomorphic to (
F2[z]
(z − 1)4
)∗
.
Observe that in fact in this case all the elements in T (2, 1, 4) are invertible, as expected.
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Chapter 7
Invertible Linearized Polynomials
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we provide we provide a detailed group structure for invertible q-linearized
polynomials over Fqm having coefficients over a subfield Fqd . In what follows we use the results
of Chapter 6. This is a joint work with Reto Schnyder.
7.1.1 Notation
We now fix the notation that will be used in the whole chapter. Let k be a field and d a
positive integer. Let us denote by Matd(k) the algebra of d by d matrices over k. Let m be a
positive integer and p be a prime number. Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p and Fqm
the extension field of degree m, and take {α, αq, . . . , αqm−1} to be a normal Fq-basis of Fqm .
Moreover, let us denote by φq the Frobenius automorphism of Fqm over Fq. Since in this chapter
we will not deal with p-adic numbers we will use the notation Zp to address the additive group
(Z/pZ,+). For d | m, we denote by
L (q,m, d) := Fqd [φq] = {F : Fqm → Fqm | F ∈ Fqd [x]} ∩ EndFq (Fqm)
the algebra of linearized polynomials with coefficients in the subfield Fqd . If d = 1, we leave out
the third argument: L (q,m) := L (q,m, 1).
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7.2 Group structure for L (q, d,m)∗
In this section we provide additional structure to the group L (q,m, d)∗, described first in [3].
Let n′ = m/d and n′ = npt with gcd(n, p) = 1. In [3, Theorem 4.3], in order to describe
GLd(Fq[z]/(zn
′ − 1)), the ring Fq[z]/(zn′ − 1) is decomposed (using the Chinese Remainder
Theorem) as
Fq[z]/(zn
′ − 1) ∼=
λ∏
i=1
Fq[z]/(hi(z)ei).
Here, λ, e1, . . . , eλ ∈ N, and the hi(z) are distinct irreducible polynomials such that zn′ − 1 =∏λ
i=1 hi(z)
ei . Notice that ei = p
t for all i: Write
zn
′ − 1 = (zn − 1)pt
and note that zn − 1 has no repeated irreducible factors, since
gcd(zn − 1, ∂(zn − 1)) = gcd(zn − 1, nzn−1) = 1.
We denote the degree of hi(z) by δi (an interesting study of the degrees occurring in the factor-
ization of xn − 1 is provided in [41]).
Recalling that GL(R× S) = GL(R)×GL(S), we have
L (q,m, d)∗ ∼=
λ∏
i=1
GLd(Fq[z]/(hi(z)p
t
)). (7.1)
Our goal is now to provide a more specific structure for each component GLd(Fq[z]/hi(z)p
t
).
We first need an elementary lemma from ring theory.
Lemma 85. Let S be a (possibly noncommutative) ring, r ∈ R be an invertible element and
e ∈ Z(S) a central and nilpotent element. Then 1− re is invertible.
Proof. Let n be the smallest integer such that en = 0. A direct computation shows that the
inverse of 1− re is
n−1∑
i=0
riei.
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We recall this elementary proposition from group theory (see for example []).
Proposition 86. Let G be a group and K, N be subgroups of G. Let N be normal, KN = G
and K ∩N = 1. Then G is a semidirect product of K and N .
Remark 87. Let t be a positive integer, Fq be a finite field of characteristic p and f(z) ∈ Fq[z]
be an irreducible polynomial of degree D. Then the ring Fq[z]/(f(z)p
t
) contains a copy of the
finite field FqD . In particular, this copy consists of Fq[zp
t
]/(f(z)p
t
). In symbols:
Fq[zp
t
]/(f(z)p
t
) =

D−1∑
j=0
ajz
jpt

aj∈Fq
∼= FqD .
Theorem 88. Let d, t ∈ N and G := GLd(Fq[z]/(h(z)pt)). Let
N := 1 + h(z) Matd (Fq[z]/(h(z)p
t
)).
Then G is isomorphic to the semidirect product N oζ GLd(Fqdeg(h)) for some morphism
ζ : GLd(Fqdeg(h)) −→ Aut(N)
Proof. We want to realize G as a semidirect product. Observe that K := GLd(Fq[zp
t
]/h(z)p
t
) is
a subgroup of G and, by Remark 87, K ∼= GL d(Fqdeg (h)). Indeed, we write the exact sequence
1→ N → GLd(Fq[z]/(h(z)pt))→ K → 1
where the last nontrivial morphism consists of raising to the power pt each entry of a matrix in
GL d(Fq[z]/(h(z)p
t
)). We now verify the properties stated in Proposition 86.
• Observe that N is normal in G.
• K ∩N = 1. Let g ∈ K ∩N , then
g ∈ Matd(Fq[zpt ]/(h(z)pt)) ∩N.
Therefore, g = 1+h(z)A ∈ Matd(Fq[zpt ]/(h(z)pt)) for some matrixA in Matd(Fq[z]/(h(z)pt)).
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Then,
a := h(z)A ∈ Matd(Fq[z]/(h(z)pt)).
Therefore, by considering any entry of a, say h(z)p(z), we get the equation
h(z)p(z) = u(zp
t
)
for some u(zp
t
) ∈ Fq[zpt ]/(h(z)pt). By raising the above equation to the pt, we get
0 = h(z)p
t
p(z)p
t
= u(zp
t
)p
t
.
It follows that u(zp
t
) is zero, since Fq[zp
t
]/(h(z)p
t
) is a field. Therefore, every entry of a
is zero, and so g = 1 as we wanted.
• NK = G. By looking at the exact sequence we observe that G/N ∼= K, which implies
|K||N | = |G|. Moreover, we have |K||N | = |KN | because K ∩ N = 1. This implies
|KN | = |G|, which in turn implies KN = G.
Due to this construction, the morphism associated to the semidirect product is the conjugation
by elements in K. More precisely, it is
ζK : K −→ Aut(N)
defined by
ζK(F )(a) := FaF
−1
for all a ∈ N and F ∈ K.
Remark 89. For the sake of completeness we have to describe how ζ is realized. Let ψ : Fq[z]/(h(z))→
Fq[zp
t
]/(h(z)p
t
) be an isomorphism of fields and
ψ : GL d(Fqdeg(h)) −→ GLd(Fq[zp
t
]/(h(z)p
t
)) = K
be its extension to the invertible matrix group
ζ = ζK ◦ ψ.
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As stated, the conclusion of Theorem 88 may look somewhat technical. We derive some
interesting consequences in what follows.
As subproduct we get
Corollary 90. Let l, n, d ∈ N, and let n be odd, q = 2l and m = 2nd. Then
L (q,m, d)∗ ∼=
λ∏
i=1
Zd
2lδi
2 oΓ GLd(F2lδi )
for some Γ: GL d(F2lδi )→ Aut(Zd
2lδi
2 ) suitably defined.
Proof. Observe the equivalences
(Zd
2lδi
2 ,+)
∼= (Fd2δi2l ,+)
∼= (Matd (F2l [z]/hi(z)),+)
∼= (1 + hi(z) Matd (F2l [z]/hi(z)2), ·).
The thesis now follows by combining formula (7.1) with Theorem 88 for q = 2l and t = 1.
Remark 91. The reader should observe that the morphism Γ is determined by the equivalences
in the proof of Corollary 90.
7.2.1 The commutative case
We now describe the case d = 1, where the coefficients of the linearized polynomials are contained
in the base field Fq. Let again
∏λ
i=1 hi(z) be the factorization of z
n − 1 into irreducible factors
over Fq[z].
Theorem 92. Let n, l, t ∈ N and p be a prime number not dividing n. Moreover, let q = pl and
m = ptn. Then
L (q,m, 1)∗ ∼=
(
Zlnr1p × · · · × Zlnrtpt
)
×
λ∏
i=1
Zqδi−1,
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where
rk = p
t−k+1 − 2pt−k + pt−k−1 for k = 1, . . . , t− 1
rt = p− 1.
Proof. Let
Ni := 1 + hi(z)Mat1(Fq[z]/(hi(z)p
t
)) = 1 + hi(z)Fq[z]/(hi(z)p
t
),
Gi := (Fq[z]/(hi(z)p
t
))∗ and Ki := (Fq[zp
t
]/(hi(z)
pt))∗ ∼= Zqδi−1. By Theorem 88 and for-
mula (7.1) we have
L (q,m, 1)∗ ∼=
λ∏
i=1
Gi ∼=
λ∏
i=1
Ni ×Ki.
The reader should observe that in the previous equation the semidirect product drops, since Ni
is commutative (and then the conjugation acts trivially on Ni) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}.
We will now consider eachNi for i ∈ {1, . . . , λ} separately. Any element f(z) ∈ Fq[z]/(hi(z)pt)
can be uniquely written as
f(z) =
pt−1∑
j=0
fj(z)hi(z)
j (7.2)
for some fj(z) ∈ Fq[z] of degree less than δi. The elements f(z) ∈ Ni are exactly those with
f0(z) = 1. Clearly, any such element satisfies f(z)
pt = 1.
Claim. Let f(z) ∈ Ni and k ≥ 0. Then, f(z)pk = 1 if and only if f0(z) = 1 and fj(z) = 0 for
j = 1, . . . , pt−k − 1.
Proof. Let g(z) = f(z) − 1. The claim is equivalent to saying that g(z)pk = 0 if and only if
gj(z) = 0 for j = 0, . . . , p
t−k − 1 (gj(z) as in equation (7.2)). Write
g(z)p
k
=
pt−1∑
j=0
gj(z)
pkh(z)jp
k
.
The “if” direction is now obvious. For the “only if” direction, assume that g(z)p
k
= 0 but
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j0 := min{j | gj(z) 6= 0} < pt−k. If we lift to Fq[z], this means that
hi(z)
pt
∣∣∣ pt−1∑
j=0
gj(z)
pkh(z)jp
k
⇒ hi(z)pt−j0pk
∣∣∣ pt−1∑
j=j0
gj(z)
pkh(z)jp
k−j0pk
⇒ hi(z)
∣∣∣ pt−1∑
j=j0
gj(z)
pkh(z)jp
k−j0pk
⇒ hi(z)
∣∣ gj0(z)pk .
Since hi(z) is irreducible, we see that hi(z) | gj0(z). But this is impossible, since gj0(z) 6= 0 and
deg gj0 < δi.
We now count the number of elements f(z) ∈ Ni with f(z)pk = 1. From the claim, we see
that ∣∣∣{f(z) ∈ Ni | f(z)pk = 1}∣∣∣ = qδi(pt−pt−k) = plδi(pt−pt−k).
On the other hand, by the structure theorem of finite abelian groups, we can write
Ni ∼= Zs1p × Zs2p2 × · · · × Zstpt
for some s1, . . . , st ∈ N. Counting the elements of order dividing pk, we have
∣∣∣{f(z) ∈ Ni | f(z)pk = 1}∣∣∣ = ps1 · p2s2 . . . pksk · pksk+1 . . . pkst .
This gives the system of linear equations
lδi(p
t − pt−k) = s1 + 2s2 + · · ·+ ksk + ksk+1 + · · ·+ kst
for k = 1, . . . , t. We get the solution
sk = lδi(p
t−k+1 − 2pt−k + pt−k−1) for k = 1, . . . , t− 1
st = lδi(p− 1).
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Write sk = lδi · rk. We then get
L (q,m, 1)∗ ∼=
λ∏
i=1
Ni ×Ki
∼=
λ∏
i=1
(
Zlδir1p × · · · × Zlδirtpt
)
×
λ∏
i=1
Cqδi−1
∼=
(
Zlnr1p × · · · × Zlnrtpt
)
×
λ∏
i=1
Cqδi−1
as claimed.
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Part III
Knapsacks
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Chapter 8
A general construction for
multiplicative knapsack schemes
The results contained in this chapter come from a joint work with Michele Schiavina [31].
8.1 Introduction
Building new asymmetric encryption schemes has always been one of the main goals of cryptog-
raphers. After the idea of public key cryptography was presented in [10], only few more public
key encryption schemes were developed such as the RSA [43], the El Gamal [11], the McEliece
cryptosystem [28], the NTRU [18] or the HFE [39] (for an overview [16]). Some new ideas for
building new cryptographic schemes based on semigroup actions can also be found in [26]. What
D. Naccache and J. Stern built in [36] was a proposal for an asymmetric protocol (NSK). The
NSK protocol consists of a shuﬄing modulo p of an easy problem over the integers, i.e. the fac-
torization of a composite integer where the prime factors are chosen among a fixed set of small
size. Given p a prime and Z/pZ the finite field of remainder classes, the NSK protocol is based
on the unique factorization property of Z, which guarantees the uniqueness of the encryption.
This approach can be generalized to the case of multiplicative monoids (Section 8.1.1), and
the NSK protocol is just a particular instance for the monoid (Z, ·) of the general framework
(subsection 8.1.2). Using this new general setting we are able to construct an analogous of the
NSK protocol relying on the unique factorization properties of Fq[x], instead of Z, where Fq is
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the finite field of order q (Section 8.2). The security of our particular proposal will rely on the
arithmetic structure of the finite field Fq[x]/(h(x)) for some h(x) ∈ Fq[x], irreducible of suitable
degree (instead of the finite field of remainder classes Z/pZ). One of the main advantages of
this kind of setting is that the security is based on an exponentiation over a finite field in such a
way that it will be unfeasible for an attacker even to set up a discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
Indeed, as we will show in the following, since the optimal version of the NSK protocol requires
that the chosen prime be next to
∏
i pi, the factorization of p− j for some small j could allow
for a reduction to a DLP. In our case, instead, we choose a set of irreducible polynomials and
fix the degree of the reducing polynomial. By doing so there is no information leakage. Our
new structural conditions will be related only to the degree of the carrier polynomials used for
the encryption.
In subsection 8.6 some issues concerning the security of the protocol will be addressed, in
particular to avoid subgroup attacks, that could possibly lead to information.
This new setting will lead to some advantages in terms of computational costs of encryption
and decryption. In fact, arithmetic over finite fields Fqm is considered to be preferable than
arithmetic over Zp when p ' qm and q  p in terms of computations. We will analyse the key
features of our protocol, such as the number of parameters involved for the setting up of the
public key, and this will allow us to show a greater deal of flexibility, in comparison with the
NSK protocol.
In subsection 8.5 we will analyse the asymptotics of the information rate of our protocol,
showing that it is equal to that of [36]. An exact formula for the information rate will also be
provided.
As a subproduct, we present in Section 8.7 a variation of the polynomial protocol where
the irreducibility of h(x) is dropped. The encryption is performed over a suitable direct sum of
fields, and a decryption is available thanks to the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
8.1.1 The new class
In this section we will present a generalized version of the protocol presented in [36].
Let S be a monoid and ∼ a finite index congruence on S. We will denote the class of an
element s ∈ S with respect to ∼ as [s].
Definition 93. A morphism ψ will be said to be ∼proper, if
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• ψ : S −→ S is injective;
• ψ is compatible with ∼ (i.e. ψ(x) ∼ ψ(y) iff x ∼ y);
• the induced application ψ˜ : S/∼ −→ S/∼ is invertible.
Definition 94. Given L ∈ N we will say that S is L-cryptable under ∼ if there exists a ∼proper
morphism ψ and elements s1, . . . , sL ∈ S such that
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ S/ ∼
m = (m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
[
L∏
i=1
ψ(si)
mi
]
is an injective application.
The following proposition will be useful later on
Proposition 95. Given a monoid S that is L-cryptable under ∼, the following maps are also
injective:
αψ : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
ψ(si)
mi
α∼ : ZL2 −→ S/ ∼
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
[
L∏
i=1
smii
]
α : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
smii .
Proof. The proof follows by observing that, since ψ is ∼proper morphism, then also α∼ is
injective. Also αψ∼ injective implies that α
ψ is injective. Again, since ψ is an injection, also α is
injective.
As we have already pointed out, this properties are necessary to keep the encryption mean-
ingful. In the following we will see how it is possible to find non trivial examples of this
construction.
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Now, denote the image of any map f between sets by =(f), and consider the following
problems:
Problem 96. Given c ∈ =(αψ∼) find m such that αψ∼(m) = c.
Problem 97. Given c′ ∈ =(α∼) find m such that α∼(m) = c′.
Let now S, be an L-cryptable monoid under a congruence ∼. Whenever a given triple
(S,∼, ψ) is such that Problem 96 is difficult, Problem 97 is easy we define a cryptosystem as
follows. Let
(S,∼, L, ψ˜([s1]), . . . , ψ˜([sL]))
be the public key and
(ψ˜−1, s1, . . . , sL)
be the secret key, the main operations are given by
• Encryption: E(m) := αψ∼(m) =
∏L
i=1 ψ˜([si])
mi =: c;
• Decryption: D(c) is given by solving Problem 97 for c′ = ψ˜−1(c).
Remark 98. The reader should observe that in the definition of the protocol we did not use
the injectivity of ψ nor the fact that S/ ∼ is a quotient of a monoid S. This is nevertheless
the case in all the examples of this protocol we could find, where Problem 97 is easy since a
suitable lift to S is given. Indeed, in practical situations the problem will be solved computing
(α−1 ◦ Γ)(c′) where Γ is a lift S/ ∼−→ S such that the following diagram
ZL2
α //
α∼
""
=(α)
=(α∼)
Γ̂
OO
(8.1)
commutes when Γ̂ := Γ|=(α∼)
Remark 99. Notice that the information rate is given by L/b where b is the number of bits
that are needed to represent an element of S/ ∼
In what follows we will show how the NSK protocol fits in this rather general framework, as
well as brand new protocols involving polynomials over finite fields.
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8.1.2 NSK as a particular instance
In this section we will show how the Naccache-Stern (NSK) protocol fits in our general frame-
work, in the case S = (Z, ·).
Consider the prime ideal P = 〈p〉 generated by a prime number p ∈ Z. Let us denote by ∼
the congruence induced by the ideal P . Such a congruence is obviously of finite index. Let v be
a positive integer with u = v−1 mod p− 1, and let
ψ : Z −→ Z
a 7−→ av.
It can be easily checked that ψ is a ∼proper morphism of Z.
Now choose L distinct prime numbers pi such that
∏L
i=1 pi < p.
Proposition 100. The map
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ Z/pZ
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7−→
[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
] (8.2)
is an injection and (Z, ·) is therefore L-cryptable under the relation induced by the ideal generated
by p.
Proof. Assume that there exist two L-tuples (m1, . . . ,mL), (n1, . . . , nL) such that α
ψ
∼(m1, . . . ,mL) =
αψ∼(n1, . . . , nL), then
[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnivi
]
⇒
[
L∏
i=1
pmivi
]u
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnivi
]u
⇔
[
L∏
i=1
pmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnii
]
in Z/pZ. Since
∏L
i=1 p
mi
i and
∏L
i=1 p
ni
i are smaller than p we also have
L∏
i=1
pmii =
L∏
i=1
pnii (8.3)
in the unique factorization domain Z, which implies mi = ni ∀i.
Remark 101. Notice that we are able to express equation (8.3) because we can always consider
the canonical representative x ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} in the remainder class modulo p. This represen-
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tative is also the only representative in =(α) by construction, and therefore we have a canonical
lift satisfying (8.1).
Remark 102. The reader should observe that when p = t +
∏
i pi for t small, than the in-
formation rate is maximal. Unfortunately in this case factoring p − t is easy because p − t is
pL-smooth and pL  p, and this gives informations about the bare carriers pi’s. Indeed in this
case breaking the NSK protocol is not harder than solving the DLP for the pi’s. Nevertheless
the protocol remains interesting for additional features like [36, Section 3].
8.2 A polynomial version
In this section we give a version of the protocol that works over Fqd instead of Z/pZ in such a
way that qd will be of the same order of magnitude than the size p of the field Z/pZ in the NSK
but q  p. In this case the specific difficult problem we want to rely on is the following
Problem 103. Let F be a finite field and L ∈ N.Given y1, . . . , yL ∈ F,
α : ZL2 −→ F
α(m) =
∏
i
ymii
and c ∈ =(α), find m such that α(m) = c.
Let now k = Fq and k[x] the polynomial ring in one variable over k. Let h(x) be an
irreducible element in k[x] of degree d. Set ∼ to be the congruence associated to the ideal
H = 〈h(x)〉 generated by the irreducible polynomial h(x). Set
S = (k[x], ·)
and
S′ := S/ ∼ = ((k[x]/H)∗, ·)
where (k[x]/H)∗ = (k[x]/H) \ {0}. Fix v, u ∈ N such that gcd (v, |S′|) = gcd(v, qd − 1) = 1 and
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uv ≡ 1 mod |S′|. Set
ψ˜ : S′ −→ S′
[s] 7−→ [sv].
Remark 104.
• ψ˜−1 : [z] 7−→ [z]u;
• k[x]/H ∼= Fqd is again a finite field.
Let now L ∈ N such that there exist L distinct irreducible monic polynomials p1, . . . , pL ∈
Fq[x] with the property
L∑
i=1
deg pi < d. (8.4)
Notice that in the present description of the protocol there are several different strategies to
choose the polynomials; we will analyse the properties of some interesting choices in the following
sections.
Again, we have the encryption map.
Proposition 105. (k[x], ·) is an L cryptable monoid with the map
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ S′
m = (m1, . . . ,mL) 7−→
[
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]
.
(8.5)
Proof. Definition 94 requires that the map αψ∼ be an injection. Assume
αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL) = α
ψ
∼(n1, . . . , nL)
[
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pvnii
]
.
It follows [
L∏
i=1
pvmii
]u
=
[
L∏
i=1
pvnii
]u
[
L∏
i=1
pmii
]
=
[
L∏
i=1
pnii
]
where, in the last equation, we can assume no reduction has happened, since property (8.4)
92
holds. Indeed
L∏
i=1
pmii =
L∏
i=1
pnii . (8.6)
Recalling that k[x] is a unique factorization domain we have mi = ni ∀i.
So our ciphered text is given by c(x) = αψ∼(m1, . . . ,mL). The explicit decryption for this
protocol is simply given by the polynomial division of the deciphered code (c(x))u, that is to
say
mi = 1⇐⇒ (c(x))u = 0 mod pi(x). (8.7)
Remark 106. We stress once again the fact that in obtaining equation (8.6) we used the
canonical lift
Γ: S/ ∼−→ S
[f(x)] 7−→ g(x)
where, for any representative l(x) ∈ [f(x)], g(x) is the remainder of the division of l(x) by
h(x) in k[x], and it is obviously independent of the choice of l(x). The decryption is effectively
performed in =(α) and the solution to Problem 97 is then given by (α−1 ◦ Γ)(c(x)u).
The information rate I = L/deg(h) log2(q) depends on the choice of the carrier polynomials.
We will explain later how to maximise this value.
Remark 107. Once the pi’s are fixed the top information rate for this protocol is obtained
when we choose h(x) such that
L∑
i=1
deg pi = deg h− 1. (8.8)
Indeed the information rate can always be maximised since it is always possible to choose h(x)
in k[x] such that (8.8) is satisfied (cf. Remark 102) without allowing for a straightforward
reduction to a DLP. This case will be analysed in detail in 8.4.
Remark 108. The reader should notice that the encryption in this protocol together with the
generic problem the attacker has to solve are similar to the ones in Lenstra’s Powerline system
[22, (2.5)]. We want now to point out the main differences between Lenstra’s approach and
ours.
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1. The form of the carriers for the powerline is quite special [22, (2.1) System Generation,
(g)]: the vi’s are in fact chosen to be all powers of linear polynomials over the base field
multiplied by a fixed element u
vi = u
k · (t− ci)k
for ci in Fq, t generator for F∗qh and u ∈ Fqh . This leads to a structural weakness as
explained in [22, Section 5].
2. In order to avoid exhaustive search attacks on the messages, both the base field Fq and the
weight of the message h (which is also the degree of the extension field) must be chosen
quite large. In our version the base field can be chosen to be small, since the number of
carriers is the only parameter on which the degree of the irreducible polynomial we select
depends on.
3. The randomness given by the multiplication by u of each carrier is paid with the condition∑
imi = h, which is a restriction we do not have.
4. It is straightforward to observe that the decryption of our variant is cheaper compared to
[22, (2.6)] in terms of computations.
5. Our approach is based on a principle that can be easily generalized to function fields using
properties of Riemann-Roch spaces as section 8.8 shows.
8.2.1 A simple example
We now give an example in which k[x] = F2[x] and the space of messages has size 29. In order to
reach a message size of 9 bits, we need exactly 9 keys, that is to say monic irreducible polynomials
in F2[x]. From finite field theory, we know that there are exactly q monic polynomials of degree
1, and
qd − q
d
irreducible monic polynomials of prime degree d. So, for q = 2 we have two polynomials of
degree 1, one polynomial of degree 2, two polynomials of degree 3 and six polynomials of degree
5. For the sake of simplicity, even if the example is non optimal as we will explain, let us choose
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all the irreducible monic polynomials of degree 1,2 and 5, summing up to exactly 9 keys, namely:
p1 = x (8.9)
p2 = 1 + x (8.10)
p3 = 1 + x+ x
2 (8.11)
p4 = 1 + x
2 + x5 (8.12)
p5 = 1 + x
3 + x5 (8.13)
p6 = 1 + x+ x
2 + x3 + x5 (8.14)
p7 = 1 + x+ x
2 + x4 + x5 (8.15)
p8 = 1 + x+ x
3 + x4 + x5 (8.16)
p9 = 1 + x
2 + x3 + x4 + x5. (8.17)
Then, the public key h(x) must be of degree
d = deg(h(x)) =
9∑
i=1
deg(pi(x)) + 1 = 35
and irreducible. For instance we may take
h(x) = 1 + x2 + x35 (8.18)
and set our protocol onto F235 ∼= (F2[x]/H)∗, whose order is 235−1 when H = 〈h(x)〉. We choose
the secret key and the decryption exponent, accordingly, to be v = 3821 and u = 25169564954,
95
so that uv = 1 mod(235 − 1). Then we may publish the 9 carrier keys pvi mod (h(x), 2):
pv1 =1 + x
2 + x4 + x10 + x12 + x18 + x22 (8.19)
+ x23 + x24 + x26 + x27 + x29 + x32
pv2 =x+ x
3 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x10 + x12 + x13 (8.20)
+ x17 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x24 + x28 + x30 + x32
pv3 =x+ x
4 + x5 + x7 + x13 + x20 + x22 (8.21)
+ x28 + x29 + x30 + x31 + x32 + x33 + x34
pv4 =1 + x
2 + x3 + x4 + x11 + x14 + x15 + x17 + x18 (8.22)
+ x19 + x20 + x21 + x24 + x28 + x30 + x34
pv5 =1 + x+ x
2 + x3 + x4 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11 + x15 (8.23)
+ x18 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x24 + x26 + x29 + x32 + x33
pv6 =1 + x+ x
2 + x4 + x7 + x12 + x13 + x15 + x16+ (8.24)
x18 + x21 + x22 + x23 + x24 + x30 + x34
pv7 =1 + x
4 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x15 + x19 + x28 + x30 + x32 + x33 (8.25)
pv8 =x+ x
3 + x4 + x5 + x8 + x10 + x12 + x13 + x15 + x16 (8.26)
+ x17 + x25 + x26 + x27 + x28 + x30
pv9 =x+ x
4 + x6 + x7 + x10 + x11 + x12 + x13 + x14 + x15 + x16 (8.27)
+ x17 + x18 + x20 + x23 + x24 + x30 + x31 + x32 + x33.
Suppose we want to send the message m = 111000111 ∈ Z92, we encode it into
c =
9∏
i=1
pvmii mod (h(x), 2)
= x2 + x3 + x6 + x10 + x15 + x16 + x17 + x18
+ x20 + x21 + x23 + x26 + x27 + x30 + x31 + x33 + x34. (8.28)
Once the message has been received, it is sufficient to take the u-th power, and the result is
96
as follows:
cu =
9∏
i=1
pvumii mod (h(x), 2) =
9∏
i=1
pmii
= x+ x3 + x4 + x6 + x11 + x12 + x14 + x15 + x16 + x19 (8.29)
whose factorization yields:
Factor2(c
u) =x(1 + x)(1 + x+ x2)(1 + x+ x2 + x3 + x5)
(1 + x+ x3 + x4 + x5)(1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5).
(8.30)
We used the factorization algorithm in this simple example because we are working with small
messages. The decryption algorithm presented in (8.7) is to be considered preferential.
The information rate associated to this encryption protocol is
I = L
deg(h)
=
9
35
∼= 25, 7% (8.31)
with the size of the space of messages being 29.
Remark 109. A similar example is presented in [36], with 28 messages. In the cited example
the information rate is slightly higher than ours, yet comparable, but the space of messages is
smaller.
If we wanted to match the size of space of messages it would be sufficient to remove one
polynomial of degree 5, obtaining an information rate of I = 8/30 ∼ 26, 7%.
Remarkably enough, as in the NSK-protocol there is apparently no key leakage, our protocol
preserves the security of the carrier keys. As a matter of fact, factoring the ciphertext c, one
gets no information whatsoever on the cleartext, as it can be seen in the given example:
Factor2(c) = x
2
(
x4 + x3 + 1
)
(x28 + x25 + x24 + x23 + x22 + x21 + x20 + x18+
x17 + x15 + x14 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1)
Remark 110. More generally, let g(x) be the public modulus and
pvm11 p
vm2
2 · · · pvmLL ≡ c(x) mod g(x)
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a ciphertext. Observe that over Fq[x] we have
P (x) = pvm11 p
vm2
2 . . . p
vmL
L = t(x)g(x) + c(x)
for some t(x) ∈ Fq[x]. Now notice that inferring on the factorization of P (x) from the data of
c(x) in terms of the factor basis
{pvm11 , . . . , pvmLL }
is the difficult problem on which the protocol relies, since the factorization of polynomials
behaves badly with respect to reductions modulo irreducible polynomials. As a matter of fact,
we base the security of our protocol on the randomness of the factorization of elements in the
image of the map
Γg,c : Fq[x] −→ Fq[x]
Γg,c(t(x)) = t(x)g(x) + c(x).
In general, the usual security one expects using prime numbers as carriers (NSK) can be extended
to monic irreducible polynomials.
As we already pointed out, we are using here a non-optimal setting for our example, in that
we skipped the polynomials of degree 3 and 4, and used all those of degree 5 instead. If we
decided to optimize the information rate, we could take the two polynomials of degree 1, the
single polynomial of degree 2, two of degree 3 and three of degree 4, for an overall encoding
power of 28 messages. Notice that the space of messages is again equal to the example given in
[36].
Choosing polynomials of degree 3 and 4 instead of 5 allows us to reduce the degree of h(x),
that is to say the number of bits that are needed to encrypt a message. So, if we compute the
information rate in this case we obtain a much better result:
I = log2m
log2 c
=
8
23
∼= 34, 78% (8.32)
which is slightly higher than the information rate presented in [36] for the same message size.
The procedure works exactly the same when we change the ground field from p = 2 to p = 3.
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This time we may choose three polynomials of degree 1, three of degree 2 and two of degree 3,
all monic and irreducible, allowing us to reduce the overall degree of h(x) to deg(h(x)) = 16. In
this case, for the same message size, we get an information rate of
I = 8
16 log2 3
∼= 31, 55% (8.33)
which is not better than the information rate in [36], for a space of messages of the same size,
yet comparable.
8.3 Flexibility of the protocol
We have already pointed out in the previous sections that the important condition (8.4) can
be fulfilled in several different ways according to the strategy we use in choosing the carrier
polynomials pi’s. In what follows we will present a strategy that optimises the information rate
and one that, to our analysis, improves security.
We will give a detailed analysis of the asymptotics of the information rate of our protocol
and of NSK, showing that they have the same behaviour. In what follows our finite field k will
be Fq for some prime power q.
8.4 Optimization of the information rate
The optimization of the information rate is ensured by the following:
Proposition 111. There exists a strategy that maximises the information rate I for any choice
of q and L. Moreover, in this strategy the information rate is determined by the closed formula
I(q,N) =
N∑
n=1
1
n
∑
k|n
µ
(
n
k
)
qk(
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(
n
k
)
qk + 1
)
log2 q
(8.34)
where µ(x) is the Mo¨bius function.
Proof. We defined the information rate to be I = L/(deg h log2 q) and we know that the degree
of h depends on the particular choice of carrier polynomials. The strategy we will consider
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is simply given by choosing all irreducible polynomials of all degrees up to a given degree N .
Denote the number of degree-n irreducible polynomials in Fq[x] by Dqn, we have the formula
Dqn =
1
n
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
)
qk
where µ(x) is the Mo¨bius function. The overall number of chosen polynomials, that is the
number of bits that the plain text is composed by, as well as the sum of the degrees of the pi’s
are given by a closed formula, namely:
L =
N∑
n=1
Dqn =
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
) qk
n
(8.35)
deg(h(x)) =
N∑
n=1
nDqn + 1 =
N∑
n=1
∑
k|n
µ
(n
k
)
qk + 1 (8.36)
for some maximal degree N (which is dependent on L if we consider L to be the fundamental
parameter). Then, the information rate I as a function of the prime power q and (implicitly)
the parameter L has the desired closed expression.
It is easy to gather that such a choice of the polynomials guarantees maximal information
rate, in that we are lowering as much as possible the degree of h(x) and as a result the number
of bits of the encrypted message.
Remark 112. The obvious disadvantage of the strategy above is that one can always assume
that the bare carrier polynomials are known, for we take all of them progressively up to degree
N. As a matter of fact, the strategy above gives us a clear upper bound for the information
rate, for all different combinations of L and q. Notice, however, by comparison with the tables
of [36], that this is the same strategy adopted by Naccache and Stern, where the chosen prime
p has the same size of NextPrime(
∏
pi).
Within this strategy it is important to notice that all the variations proposed in [36, Section
2.3] are importable in the present context. For example, it is possible to express the message m
in a basis different from 2, and this would lead to some modification to the suitable degrees for
our carriers. Moreover, it is possible to restrict the space of messages to constant-weight strings.
This last choice increases the information rate since it allows to lower the degree of h(x). In
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L (bits) deg h (bits) I
131 1024 12,8 %
233 2048 11,4%
418 4096 11,2%
Table 8.1: Information rate matching with [36, Section 2.2]
L (bits) M (bits) Size of p & deg h (bits) I
759 758 8192 11,4%
Table 8.2: Extension to next block and matching of the information rate
fact, if w is the constant weight, the bound on the degree of h is:
deg h > wN
where N is the highest degree of the chosen carriers.
Apart from these extensions, the standard NSK protocol is summarized in the table presented
in [36, Section 2.2], where the information rate for 512, 1024 and 2048 bits-sized p’s is given.
The strategy we have just outlined to reach the maximal information rate, allows us to obtain
the exact values presented in [36] matching the degree of our polynomial h with the size of their
prime p and L with the size M of the message. So we are able to obtain the same information
rate.
The matching procedure works as follows: compute the degree of h obtained by choosing all
polynomials up to a given degree, say 9 to obtain deg h = 977. Then, top it to the next block, in
this case 1024 bits, choosing some polynomials of one degree higher, in this case 11. This leads
to an increase in the number L of carrier polynomials from 127 to 131, and the information rate
is then given by the ratio L/deg h.
In Table 8.1 we show how to match the examples presented in [36], and the last row is
obtained by extending their calculations to 4096 bits. If we go further and compute the relevant
figures in the case of 8192 bits we find almost perfect agreement also in this case (cf. Table 8.2).
It will be clear in what follows why this happens.
8.5 Asymptotics comparison with previous works
We will prove in this section that our protocol has the same asymptotic information rate of [36].
A naive explanation of this fact is given by arguing that the number of primes below a certain
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number of bits has the same behaviour as the number of irreducible polynomials in Fq[x] below
a certain degree.
Let us fix the notation
aN ∼ bN ⇐⇒ lim
N→∞
aN
bN
= 1.
We will make use of the following
Lemma 113.
N∑
n=1
Dqn ∼
q
q − 1D
q
N (8.37)
Proof. First recall that [44, Theorem 2.2] Dqn ∼ q
n
n and therefore the sums behave asymptotically
as
N∑
n=1
Dqn ∼
N∑
n=1
qn
n . Then we have (8.37) if and only if
lim
N→∞
N∑
n=1
qn
n
qN
N
=
q
q − 1 . (8.38)
Now, denote by SN :=
N∑
n=1
N
n q
n−N and observe that it might be expressed in terms of the
recursive sequence
SN+1 =
1
q
N + 1
N
SN + 1. (8.39)
for the initial value S1 = 1. Consider S− = lim infN→∞ SN and S+ = lim sup
N→∞
SN . Passing to
the lim sup and lim inf in (8.39) we get the same equation for S±:
S± =
S±
q
+ 1
provided that they are both finite. Assuming that they are, we conclude that
lim
N→∞
SN = S± =
q
q − 1 (8.40)
This assumption is legitimate since SN ≥ 0 for all N ∈ N, thus S− ≥ 0, and for S+ we
observe that
• When x ∈ R+ we have that qxx is increasing for x ≥ 1log q ≥ 2, since q ≥ 2, and in particular
this is true for x ∈ N∗;
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• lim supN→∞ NqN
N∑
n=1
qn
n = lim supN→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=2
qn
n .
It follows that
lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=1
qn
n
= lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
N∑
n=2
qn
n
≤ lim sup
N→∞
N
qN
∫ N+1
2
qx
x
dx
where the last inequality comes from the fact that
N∑
n=2
qn
n are the lower sums of
∫ N+1
2
qx
x dx,
since q
x
x is increasing for x ≥ 2. Moreover
lim
N→∞
∫ N+1
2
qx
x dx
qN
N
= lim
t→∞
∫ t+1
2
qx
x dx
qt
t
= lim
t→∞
qt+1
t+1
qt
t (log q − 1t )
=
q
log q
where the second equality follows from the De L’Hoˆpital rule. This proves that
0 ≤ lim inf
N→∞
SN ≤ lim sup
N→∞
SN ≤ q
log q
and yields the claim.
We are now ready to prove
Proposition 114.
I(q,N) ∼ 1
log2 q
1
N
(8.41)
Proof. Observe that nDqn ∼ qn and therefore, from (8.34)
I(q,N) ∼
( N∑
n=1
qn
n
)/(
log2 q
N∑
n=1
qn
)
Now, it is easy to gather that
N∑
n=1
qn ∼ q
q − 1q
N (8.42)
then, plugging the results of (8.42) and of Lemma 113 into (8.34), we obtain
I(q,N) ∼ 1
log2 q
q
q−1
qN
N
q
q−1q
N
=
1
log2 q
1
N
. (8.43)
We would like to compare this result with the information rate of the NSK protocol. Notice
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that in order to make a consistent comparison we must understand the role of our parameter N
in the NSK.
Once q is fixed, bounding the degree of the carrier polynomials by N is the same as bounding
the number of bits required to represent any of them by the quantity M = bN log2(q)c.
The analogous bound for the NSK is then given by bounding the number of bits of the prime
carriers by M . This is the same as bounding the prime carriers themselves by 2M ' qN . In the
following proposition the comparison is made explicit.
Proposition 115. Let N be the bound on the degree of the carrier polynomials and M =
bN log2(q)c the analogous bound for the bits of the prime carriers in the NSK. The information
rate for the NSK protocol is asymptotically given by
INSK ∼ 1
log2 q
1
N
. (8.44)
Proof. It is known that for large m ∈ N
∏
p<m
p ∼ em.
Let us consider m = 2M ' qN , then ∏p<qN p ∼ exp qN . Now, the number of prime numbers up
to qN asymptotically goes, by the prime number theorem, as
pi(qN ) ∼ q
N
N ln q
.
In our case this will be the number of carrier prime numbers up to qN . On the other hand
exp qN , which is the size of the prime modulus of [36], has
⌊
qN log2 e
⌋
digits, and therefore the
information rate is computed as
INSK ∼
qN
N ln q
qN log2 e
=
1
log2 q
1
N
. (8.45)
By comparing Propositions 114 and 115 it is now clear that the two information rates have
the same behaviour. This explains that the matching procedure we perform at the end of the
previous section will attain the information rate of NSK also in the asymptotic limit. Moreover
it justifies the claim on the large-N behaviour of irreducible polynomials with respect to prime
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numbers.
8.6 Some precautions to avoid subgroup-like attacks
The security of this protocol is strictly related to the size of the degree of h and, as a consequence,
to the range of degrees that the carriers can have. Indeed, when the carriers are chosen within
a large set, the attacker will not have chances (in terms of a brute force attack) to find the pi’s
to set up a discrete logarithm problem for the pair (pi, p
s
i ) for any i.
As a matter of fact, the knowledge of h will only lead to the following information on the
degrees:
deg(h) =
∑
i
deg(pi) + 1.
This is not the case when working with integers and primes in Z/pZ, where we can always
assume that the prime factors are known when p '∏i pi.
We first sketch a subgroup like attack in the most unsafe case. Let G be an abelian group
and pv1, . . . , p
v
L be carriers, as in Section 8.2. Let the order of p
v
i in G be ni and suppose
gcd (ni, nj) = 1 for i 6= j. Let now
Mj = n1 · · ·nj−1 · nj+1 · · ·nL.
It is easy to observe that, for a generic ciphertext c, mj = 1 if and only if c
Mj 6= 1. As it is
elementary to observe, this leads to decryption in L steps. Moreover, it can also be adapted
to work when the condition gcd (ni, nj) = 1 is just partially fulfilled. In this case, indeed, only
partial information on the text can be extracted.
Consider now the decomposition in cyclic subgroups of the multiplicative group of the finite
field (Fqd)∗. In order to avoid subgroup-like attacks on the ciphertext we will require all the pi’s
to be generators of the same subgroup of large order. This will lead to certain requirements on
qd − 1.
The most natural choice to solve this problem is asking that the degree d of the reducing
polynomial h(x) be constrained by the following:
r :=
qd − 1
q − 1 is prime. (8.46)
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Now one could choose the pi’s such that
pi(x)
r 6= 1 mod h(x) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L}. (8.47)
8.7 “Chinese remainder” version
In what follows we will present another example of a protocol that fits the general picture,
which stems on the well known chinese remainder theorem. To do this, let us introduce a large
prime power q and a natural number L ∈ N. Consider now the monoid S = (FL+1q )∗, with the
multiplication defined componentwise, and the set R = {r1, . . . , rL+1} ⊆ Fq.
Let αi ∈ Fq\R ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and choose two large integers u, v such that uv = 1 mod (q−
1). Compute the following list of vectors pi ∈ (FL+1q )∗ as
(gi)j := (rj − αi)
(pi)j := (gi)
v.
Let
((FL+1q )∗, {p1, . . . , pL})
be the public key and
({g1, . . . , gL}, {r1 . . . rL})
be the secret key. Let
F : ZL2 −→ S
(m1, . . . ,mL) 7→
L∏
i=1
pmii
be the encryption map.
Remark 116. Observe that the information rate is
L
(L+ 1) log2(q)
.
Proposition 117. F is an injection.
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Proof. We define a polynomial on Fq[x] by
hR(x) :=
L+1∏
i=1
(x− ri)
whose set of zeros coincide with R. We will prove the proposition by showing how to compute
the inverse over the image of F using h(x), i.e. we will show how to uniquely decrypt any
ciphertext c ∈ =(F ) using the secret key. Let
ψ : S −→ S
x 7→ xv,
G : Fq[x]/hR(x)
CRT−→ FLq
k(x) 7→ (k(r1), . . . , k(rL)),
and
Γ : Fq[x]/hR(x) −→ Fq[x]
be the canonical lift. The decryption map D is given by checking Γ(G−1(ψ−1(x))) modulo
gi(x) = (x − αi): whenever it is zero it means mi = 1, where ψ−1(x) = xu. Observe that the
decryption is well defined: the map
αψ∼ : ZL2 −→ Fq[x]/(hR(x))
is clearly injective (and then α∼ is, by Proposition 95) since the product of all the gi(x) has
degree L < L+ 1. Observe that ∼ is as usual the relation induced by the ideal of hR(x).
8.8 Function Field Knapsack Scheme
In this section we show a more theoretical version of the scheme that uses the context of function
fields of curves. For the notation and definitions we refer to [49]. Let F be a function field over
a finite field Fq. We denote by OP the valuation ring associated to the place P . Moreover, if
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f ∈ OP , then we denote by f(P ) its image in the residue field OP /P . Let {P1, . . . , PL} distinct
places of F . Let xi be a uniformizer of the place Pi invertible in the valuation ring OPj for j 6= i
(this can be done thanks to the Approximation Theorem for valuations).
Fix P a place of the holomorphy ring O containing the subring generated by x1, . . . xL.
Choose P satisfying
deg(P ) >
L∑
i=1
deg((xi)∞)
and let D =
∑L
i=1(xi)∞ Let l(D) := dimFq (L(D)).
Remark 118. Notice that, for any (m1, . . . ,mL) ∈ {0, 1}L, we have
L∏
i=1
xmii ∈ L(D).
Now observe that L(D) evaluates at P into the finite field Fqdeg(P ) . In addition L(D) embeds
into Fqdeg(P ) since an element in the kernel of the evaluation would live in L(D− P ) but D− P
is a divisor of negative degree, so L(D − P ) = 0.
Remark 119. Call ψ the embedding of L(D) into Fqdeg(P ) . Observe that, given an Fq-basis
{e1, . . . , el(D)} of L(D), ψ−1(c) is computable for any c in the image of ψ. In fact it is enough
to write down c =
∑L
i=1 aiψ(ei) for some ai ∈ Fq; then ψ−1(c) =
∑L
i aiei.
LetM = {0, 1}L be the space of messages and C := Fqdeg(P ) be the space of ciphertexts. Let
e, d ∈ Z for which ed ≡ 1 mod qdeg(P ) − 1. Now we are able to set up public and private key:
• Public key: (Fqdeg(P ) , {x1(P )e, . . . , xL(P )e})
• Private key: (F, d, {x1, . . . , xL}, ψ)
Encryption and decryption are defined as
• Encryption: let m = (m1, . . . ,mL) ∈ M. The encryption map is defined by E(m) :=∏L
i=1(xi(P )
e)mi .
• Decryption: Let c ∈ C. Compute cd and invert ψ, getting c = ∏Li=1 xmii .
Remark 120. The reader should notice that in this case hiding the residue field is not necessary,
since the attack does not have available the function field used for decryption, but only the
residue field.
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Chapter 9
Tuning the information rate for
the PNSK cryptosystem
The results in this chapter come from a joint work with Joachim Rosenthal and Reto Schnyder,
which is to appear on the book series Lecture notes in Electrical Engineering.
9.1 Prime Packing
In what follows our goal is to show that a direct adaptation of the NSK packing presented in [7]
is also possible in the case of the polynomial variant described in Chapter 8, Section 8.2. We
pack the irreducible polynomials up to degree d as follows: Let b, t ∈ N be positive integers for
which bt ≤ pi(d), where pi(d) is the number of irreducible polynomials up to degree d. Partition
the first (according to any ordering respecting the degree) bt polynomials in t sets {Si} each of
size b satisfying that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, if f ∈ Si and h ∈ Sj we have
i ≤ j ⇒ deg(f) ≤ deg(h).
More informally, we pack the polynomials up to degree d into t packs, each of them containing
the b polynomials of the lowest possible degree. Let us denote by pj,i the i-th polynomial living
in the j-th box Sj , again ordered by degree. The protocol will then be modified as follows. The
space of messages becomes {1, . . . , b}t, we require now only ∑Lj=1 deg pj,b < deg g = N . Again,
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let es ≡ 1 mod qN − 1.
The public key is set up as
({vj,i}i,j ,Fq[x]/(g(x))), where again vj,i = pej,i. The secret key
is analogously
({pj,i}i,j , s). The encryption of a message m = (m1, . . . ,mt) ∈ {1, . . . , b}t is
performed as
m 7→
t∏
j=1
vj,mj = c ∈ Fq[x]/(g(x)).
Alice can then decrypt by computing cs ∈ Fq[x]/(g(x)) and reducing the result modulo pj,i for
each i, j, as before.
It is now easy to compute the information rate and public key size: The information rate is
t log b
N log q , and the public key has size btN log q.
9.1.1 Example Parameters
As an example, consider the medium prime case q = 6287. We compare the information rate
and public key size of our scheme in the case deg g = 131 for various values of the box size b in
Table 9.1. Computations were done using Sage [47]. The first row corresponds to the original
pNSK (which is not quite the same as setting b = 1). Note that for small box sizes b, we always
get t = 130 boxes. This is because it is possible to use only degree 1 polynomials for the pj,i.
As b becomes larger, this is no longer possible, and the information rate suffers.
b t information rate public key size
pNSK 130 7.9% 215 kbit
5 130 18.3% 1074 kbit
10 130 26.1% 2149 kbit
30 130 38.6% 6447 kbit
50 127 43.4% 10496 kbit
70 109 40.4% 12612 kbit
Table 9.1: Information rate and public key size of prime packing for q = 6287, deg g = 131 and
various box sizes.
Evidently, the information rate can be greatly improved at the cost of a much larger public
key size. This cost can be somewhat reduced by applying the “powers of primes” technique
of [7], and we will do so in Section 9.2.
9.1.2 Asymptotic Information Rate
As in [7], we can obtain linear bandwidth by setting the number of packs equal to their size.
Indeed, we show that if we set n := b = t, then the information rate of pNSK using prime
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packing is asymptotically equal to 12 .
To analyze the information rate, we first need to find the degree of the n-th irreducible
polynomial pn, according to any order respecting the degree. In [31, Section 3.2.2], it was shown
that the number of irreducible polynomials in Fq[x] of degree at most d is asymptotically equal
to qq−1
qd
d . Hence, the polynomials with a given degree d should be numbered roughly between
q
q−1
qd−1
d−1 and
q
q−1
qd
d . Thus, if the polynomial pn has degree dn, we have
q
q − 1
qdn−1
dn − 1 . n .
q
q − 1
qdn
dn
,
where an . bn means that lim supn→∞ an/bn ≤ 1. Taking logarithms gives
(dn − 1)− logq(dn − 1) . logq n− logq
q − 1
q
. dn − logq dn,
which asymptotically is the same as
dn − 1 . logq n . dn.
We hence see that dn = deg pn ∼ logq n.
Now we can approximate the degree of g:
N = deg g = 1 +
n∑
i=1
deg pin
∼
n∑
i=1
logq(in) ∼
n∑
i=1
logq(n
2) ∼ 2n logq n.
For the first ∼, note that the indices of pin in the sum are all at least n, and so only the
asymptotic behaviour of deg pin is relevant. Finally, we get for the information rate
t log2 b
N log2 q
∼ n log2 n
2n logq n log2 q
=
n log2 n
2n log2 n
=
1
2
.
9.2 Powers of Primes
In [7, Section 4], prime packing was applied to a variant of NSK using a base larger than 2 in
order to further improve information rate and reduce public key size. This method can also be
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applied to the polynomial NSK variant.
As in Section 9.1, we again choose a degree d and integers b and t satisfying bt ≤ pi(d),
and we partition the first bt irreducible polynomials into t sets Si of size b. We further choose
an integer parameter ` ≥ 1. We again denote by pj,i the i-th polynomial in the j-th box. As
before, we need an irreducible polynomial g ∈ Fq[x] of large degree as our modulus, but this
time, we require that
∑L
j=1 ` deg pj,b < deg g = N . Again, we choose integers e and s with
es ≡ 1 mod qN − 1 and set vj,i = pej,i. The public key is
({vj,i}i,j , `,Fq[x]/(g(x))) and the
private key is
({pj,i}i,j , s).
For each box Si, we now have more options available for encryption than simply choosing one
element of Si: we can choose up to ` elements, allowing repetitions, and multiply those. Each of
these possibilities corresponds to a b-tuple in T = {(k1, . . . , kb) ∈ Nb | k1+· · ·+kb ≤ `}. As shown
in [7, Appendix A], there are
(
b+`
`
)
= B such tuples, and there is a bijection φ : {1, . . . , B} → T
that can be computed efficiently [46]. Hence, we use the message space {1, . . . , B}t, and we
encrypt a message m = (m1, . . . ,mt) as
m 7→
t∏
j=1
b∏
i=1
v
kj,i
j,i = c ∈ Fq[x]/(g(x)),
where φ(mj) = (kj,1, . . . , kj,b) ∈ T .
Decryption is again done by lifting and factoring cs and inverting φ.
We can again give a formula for information rate and public key size. The information rate
is t logBN log q , and the public key still has size btN log q.
9.2.1 Toy Example
We present a small example to clarify the “powers of primes” method. Let q = 2, and we
consider a system with t = 2 packs of b = 3 irreducible polynomials each. Let furthermore
` = 2. The first six irreducible polynomials are
p1,1 = x p2,1 = x
3 + x+ 1
p1,2 = x+ 1 p2,2 = x
3 + x2 + 1
p1,3 = x
2 + x+ 1 p2,3 = x
4 + x3 + 1.
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We need `deg p1,3 + `deg p2,3 = 12 < deg g = N , so we choose
g = x13 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1.
We randomly choose secret exponents e = 6020 and s = 6380 ≡ e−1 mod 213 − 1. The public
elements are now given by vj,i ≡ pej,i mod g:
v1,1 = x
11 + x10 + x9 + x8 + x6 + x5 v2,1 = x
8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + 1
v1,2 = x
11 + x10 + x9 + x8 + x6 + x v2,2 = x
12 + x11 + x6 + x5 + x3
v1,3 = x
12 + x11 + x10 + x9 + x5 + x3 + x2 + 1 v2,3 = x
12 + x11 + x10 + x6 + x5 + x2.
Note that B =
(
3+2
2
)
= 10, so we can represent a message in base 10. We choose the following
encoding from integers 0 to 9 to 3-tuples (k1, k2, k3) satisfying k1 + k2 + k3 ≤ 2.
0 7→ (0, 0, 0) 1 7→ (1, 0, 0) 2 7→ (2, 0, 0) 3 7→ (0, 1, 0) 4 7→ (1, 1, 0)
5 7→ (0, 2, 0) 6 7→ (0, 0, 1) 7 7→ (1, 0, 1) 8 7→ (0, 1, 1) 9 7→ (0, 0, 2).
To encrypt the message m = 94, we hence compute
v01,1v
0
1,2v
2
1,3 · v12,1v12,2v02,3 ≡ x12 + x9 + x8 + x3 + x2 + 1 = c mod g.
To decrypt, raise the ciphertext to s and factor:
ms ≡ x10 + x9 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x+ 1 mod g
= (x2 + x+ 1)2 · (x3 + x+ 1) · (x3 + x2 + 1)
= p01,1p
0
1,2p
2
1,3 · p12,1p12,2p02,3,
from which the message is recovered.
9.2.2 Example Parameters
We again consider the case q = 6287 and compare the information rate and public key size of the
“powers of primes” variant in the case deg g = 131 for different values for b and ` in Table 9.2.
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The first row corresponds to the original pNSK, which is obtained by setting b = 1 and ` = 1.
b ` t information rate public key size
1 1 130 7.9% 215 kbit
2 2 65 10.1% 215 kbit
10 10 13 13.8% 215 kbit
30 1 130 39.0% 6447 kbit
42 2 65 38.9% 4513 kbit
310 26 5 38.8% 2562 kbit
83 26 5 25.1% 686 kbit
Table 9.2: Information rate and public key size of the “powers of primes” variant for q = 6287,
deg g = 131 and various box sizes and bases.
As we can see, the “powers of primes” method allows, to an extent, for larger information
rates at the same key size, or for smaller keys for a given information rate.
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